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"The government of democracy is favorable to the political power of lawyers;
for when the wealthy, the noble, and the prince are excluded from the
government, the lawyers take possession of it ....1
I. INTRODUCTION
No law better illustrates the political power of law ers than the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley or the Act). Sarbanes-Oxley was
Congress's legislative response to the 2001 Enron scandal. 3 Enron, with the
help of its lawyers, used a series of off-balance-sheet transactions to hide
billions of dollars of losses from investors and thus artificially inflated its
earnings and, it followed, its stock price.4 When the losses were finally
discovered-and disclosed-Enron's stock price plummeted as investors
attempted to sell their overvalued shares. 5 In the end, investors lost billions of
dollars.
6
Corporate lawyers played a central role in helping Enron engineer the off-
balance-sheet transactions.7 Part II of this Article describes that role in detail.
1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry
Reeve trans., Francis Bowen rev., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835), quoted in David R. Derge, The
Lawyer as Decision-Maker in the American State Legislature, 21 J. POL. 408,408 (1959).
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
3. John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's Perspective,
76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 60-61 (2005).
4. See, e.g., R.T. McNamar, Lawyers as Corporate Monitors, in AFTER ENRON: LESSONS
FOR PUBLIC POLICY 171, 183 (William A. Niskanen ed., 2005) ("Approximately $13 billion [of
the off-balance-sheet debt] was incurred through structured finance transactions involving the use
of SPEs. Hence the role of the lawyers was key to the financial structure that Enron developed.");
Mike France, Close the Lawyer Loophole, BUS. WK., Feb. 2, 2004, at 70, 70 [hereinafter France,
Lawyer Loophole] ("Critical elements of many of Enron Corp.'s most deceptive balance-sheet
maneuvers were approved by big law firms .... ); Mike France, Wat About the Lawyers?, BUS.
WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58 [hereinafter France, What About the Lawyers?] ("[T]here's no way that
Enron's left hand could have sold so many assets to its right hand without creative input from both
inside and outside counsel.").
5. See, e.g., Kroger, supra note 3, at 58-59 (citing James K. Glassman, Diversify, Diversify,
Diversify, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at A10; Floyd Norris, After Two-Year Drop in Markets,
Calendar Turns on Note of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at Al) ("Enron's countless investors,
who had seen the stock price decline over the course of the year from $84 to mere pennies per
share, lost some $61 billion."); Celia R. Taylor, Breaking the Bank: Reconsidering Central Bank of
Denver After Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 MO. L. REV. 367, 375 (2006) ("The implosion of
Enron... caused billions of dollars of shareholder equity to vanish into thin air.").
6. Kroger, supra note 3, at 58-59; Taylor, supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., France, Lawyer Loophole, supra note 4 (noting the role of the lawyers in creating
Enron's financial structure); Mike France, One Big Client, One Big Hassle, BUS. WK., Jan. 28,
2002, at 38, 38 [hereinafter France, One Big Client] (stating that Enron's lawyers"played a creative
role in structuring and managing some of the company's controversial 'special purpose'
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However, Sarbanes-Oxley does nothing to prevent lawyers from assisting in
corporate fraud in the future. How could Sarbanes-Oxley, a law that purports to
prevent repetitive corporate fraud, fail to tackle the very group that aided and
abetted the fraud? My explanation, in short, is that lawyers' substantial
influence on politicians, both in terms of monetary contributions and less
tangible social and professional connections, meant that lawyers could defeat-
albeit covertly-legislation designed to prevent corporate lawyers from doing
the same in the future. In support of the above proposition, Part II of this Article
describes how corporate lawyers helped devise and structure transactions with
the sole purpose of hiding Enron' s debt. Part III explores the historical absence
of legal punishments for corporate lawyers who aid and abet such schemes. Part
IV describes how corporate lawyers were able to use their considerable
influence to defeat legislation designed to impose new legal punishments on
corporate lawyers; that is to say, at least in part, corporate lawyers escaped
Sarbanes-Oxley because they were able to curry favor with the politicians that
controlled the substantive content of the Act.
But corporate lawyers' influence is only part of the story. Although lawyers
were able to avoid new legal punishments under Sarbanes-Oxley, politicians
still needed to give the public the impression-and do so quickly-that
Congress was being tough on corporate malfeasance. 8 Politicians needed to
publicly punish some group, or some scapegoat, for the financial scandals of
2001 to 2002.'
Part V expands on the previous question: how did corporate lawyers escape
Sarbanes-Oxley while corporate officers and accountants faced greater
regulation? The sad truth is that corporate officers and accountants made easier
legislative targets than corporate lawyers. Part V describes how the business
press failed to cover the lawyers' complicity in Enron; to the contrary, the
business press's focus was almost solely on the officers' and the accountants'
roles in the Enron scandal-corporate officers and accountants were in no
position to oppose legislation in the spring of 2002. In short, the business
press's coverage encouraged politicians to turn a blind eye to lawyers at the
expense of officers and accountants.
partnerships"); France, What About the Lawyers?, supra note 4, at 60 (noting that Enron's
deceptive transactions were "cooked up by cross-disciplinary teams of lawyers, accountants, and
investment bankers").
8. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1525 (2005) ("[1]t was widely perceived in the media that
members of Congress were motivated by reelection concerns when a statute was hurriedly enacted
in the summer prior to the midterm elections.., following heightened attention on corporate
malfeasance as the WorldCom scandal erupted post-Enron.").
9. See, e.g., id. at 1526 ("The suggestion from the media was that the priority of members of
Congress was to enact something, with the specific content of less concern and importance.").
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Part VI considers and rejects the counterargument that the favorable
treatment of lawyers can be explained solely by competing policy arguments.
Instead, the existence of policy arguments on both sides of the debate-
arguments for and against regulating lawyers and regulating officers-supports
the contention that more than policy considerations were at play in the
formulation of Sarbanes-Oxley' s operative provisions. Policy arguments cannot
explain the different treatment.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENRON: PLACING THE LAWYERS' ROLE IN
PERSPECTIVE
Between 1999 and 2001, the business press "cooperated in an
intensification of Enron's good news and in a progressive suspension of good
sense and judgment." 10 The following quotes are by no means exhaustive but
are certainly representative of the business press's coverage of Enron:
[The] big winner was Enron, which returned nearly forty percent
because of the strength of its energy-trading and energy-services
operations .... 11
They're making some pretty megainvestments, and you're seeing that
pay off. 12
The real story isn't the earnings . .. . It's what lies ahead. This isn't
your father's natural-gas company.
It's absolutely astounding .... 14
No company illustrates the transformative power of innovation more
dramatically than Enron. Over the past decade Enron's commitment to
the invention-and later domination-of new business categories has
10. Paul H. Weaver, The Business Press as a Corporate Monitor: How the Wall Street
Journal and Fortune Covered Enron, in AFTER ENRON: LESSONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY, supra note
4, at 147, 163.
11. J.C. Conklin, All-Star Analysts 1999 Survey: Natural Gas, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1999, at
RI 1.
12. Kruti Trivedi, Enron Posts Rise of 29% in Profit for Second Period, WALL ST. J., July 14,
1999, at B5 (quoting Michael Barbis, analyst at Warburg Dillon Read) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
13. Rebecca Smith, Enron Net Nearly Tripled in 1st Period, Beating Estimate, as Revenue
Rose 72%, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2000, at A4 (quoting David Fleisher, utilities analyst at Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. (quoting Jeffrey Skilling, Enron President) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[VOL. 60:149
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taken it from a $200 million old-economy pipeline operator to a $40
billion new-economy trading powerhouse. 5
With constant glowing reports from the press, Enron's share price more
than quadrupled in value from $20 in 1998 to $90 in the first half of 2001.16
However, with the benefit of hindsight, we know that Enron' s financial strength
was an illusion, a house of cards; in reality, Enron was buckling under the
pressure of over $25 billion of unreported, hidden debt. 18 Enron collapsed and
declared bankruptcy just months later. 
19
Upon Enron's collapse, the business press simplistically concluded that the
scandal was caused by Enron's officers-Kenneth Lay as chief executive
officer (CEO), Jeffrey Skilling as chief operating officer (COO), and Andrew20
Fastow as chief financial officer (CFO). Certainly, Enron's officers were
eyeball deep in the scandal, but the business press largely failed to reveal that
Enron's lawyers aided and abetted the schemes that allowed Enron to hide $25
billion in debt.21 Part JJ.B discusses the extent of that assistance in full.
The President and Congress trumpeted the conclusion that the scandal was
the result of a few rogue corporate officers. On March 7, 2002, President Bush
15. Nicholas Stein, The World's Most Admired Companies: How Do You Make the Most
Admired List?, FORTUNE, Oct. 2, 2000, at 183, 184.
16. The Enron Collapse: Implications to Investors and the Capital Markets: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. and the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 62 (2002) (statement of
Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee).
17. R.T. McNamar, Bankers as Corporate Monitors, in AFTER ENRON: LESSONS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY, supra note 4, at 198, 209.
18. Id. at 205.
19. William A. Niskanen, A Crisis of Trust, in AFTER ENRON: LESSONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY,
supra note 4, at 1, 2.
20. See, e.g., France, What About the Lawyers?, supra note 4, at 58 ("[O]ne group of
professionals has so far escaped the inquisition: the energy giant's lawyers.").
21. There were, of course, exceptions to this broad failure of the business press. Mike France
at BusinessWeek provided excellent coverage. See, e.g., France, Lawyer Loophole, supra note 4
(reporting on lawyers' approval of deceptive balance-sheet maneuvers); Mike France, One Big
Client, supra note 7 at 38 (reporting on lawyers' involvement in helping Enron structure
questionable deals); France, What About the Lawyers?, supra note 4 (questioning lawyers'
supposed innocence in Enron). Dan Ackman at Forbes also provided excellent coverage. See, e.g.,
Dan Ackman, Enron's Lawyers: Eyes Wide Shut?, FORBES.COM, Jan. 28, 2002,
http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/28/0128veenron-print.html [hereinafter Ackman, Enron's
Lawyers] (reporting on lawyers' role in Enron debacle); Dan Ackman, It's the Lawyers' Turn to
Answer for Enron, FORBES.COM, Mar. 14, 2002, http://www.forbes.com
2002/03/14/0314topnews-print.html [hereinafter Ackman, It's the Laywers' Turn] (reporting on
House Commerce Committee's investigation into lawyers' role in Enron debacle). However, the
business press focused an overwhelming majority of its coverage on Enron's officers and
accountants. See, e.g., France, What About the Lawyers?, supra note 4, at 58 (noting that Enron's
attorneys escaped scrutiny while its accountants and bankers underwent investigation).
2008] SARBANES-OXLEY
5
Horton: How Corporate Lawyers Escaped Sarbanes-Oxley: Disparate Treatment
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
stated that "[r]eform should begin with accountability, and reform should start
at the top. The chief executive officer has a daily duty to oversee the entire
enterprise, the entire firm, and therefore, bears a unique responsibility."22 While
the foregoing is certainly true, there was no mention by President Bush of
corporate lawyers. Likewise, during the congressional hearings that followed
Enron, the Judiciary Committee placed the blame squarely on corporate officers
"whose actions led to Enron' s failure."23 Congress lamented the "[c]orporate
officers [who] performed poorly (to say the least) at Enron," 24 and between the
wailing and gnashing of teeth, Congress concluded that "[h]olding corporate
officers responsible for their actions [must be] a big part of the foundation of
[Sarbanes-Oxley].,25
A. The Officers: The "Smartest" Guys in the Room
2 6
Knowing what we know now, it is easy to forget that Enron was once a
successful, well-run company. The COO of Enron in the early to mid-1990s,
Rich Kinder, "ran a famously tight and disciplined ship, presciently favoring a
hard-asset strategy. ' 27 Hard assets are "those things that you can touch and
feel. ' 28 Kinder grew Enron on the back of hard assets-tens of thousands of
miles of interstate natural gas pipeline-together with power plants and water
utilities. 29 Then, in 1997, Enron changed direction when Jeffrey Skilling
22. Remarks at the Presentation of the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Awards, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 356, 357 (Mar. 7, 2002).
23. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 10-11 (2002).
24. The Legislative History of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: Hearing Before S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 968 (2002) (statement of L. William
Seidman, former Chairman, FDIC and former Chairman, Resolution Trust Corp.).
25. 148 CONG. REC. 4287, 5503 (2002) (statement ofRep. Biggert).
26. ENRON: THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (Magnolia Pictures 2005).
27. Adam Lashinsky, Rich Kinder Helped Himself to a Bigger Slice of His Own Company:
Do You Have a Problem with That?, FORTUNE, May 28, 2007, at 65, 68.
28. JOE ANASTASI, THE NEW FORENSICS: INVESTING CORPORATE FRAUD AND THE THEFr
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 92 (2003).
29. See, e.g., Niskanen, supra note 19, at 3 (stating that part of Enron's "traditional 'asset
rich' business model.., was to invest in the infrastructure of the energy, water, and
telecommunications industries"); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy
Lessons from Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787, 1793 (2002) (describing how "Enron began in the
mid-1980s as a gas pipeline company owning the largest gas pipeline in the United States"); Harry
Hurt III, Power Players: Enron Has Shaken Up the Sleepy Gas Pipeline and Power Businesses by
Aggressively Embracing Risk and Continually Remaking Itself So What's Not to Like?, FORTUNE,
Aug. 15, 1996, at 94 (reporting that in 1996, Enron "operat[ed] 37,000 miles of interstate pipeline
that transport[ed] nearly 20% of the nation's natural gas"). Building a company on hard assets did
not necessarily mean complacency-Enron was the first to tout natural gas as a substitute for coal
as an electricity generator, and to prove it, built its own natural gas generator in Texas, "showing
[VOL. 60:149
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became COO-a Harvard MBA and allegedly "the most intellectually brilliant
executive in the natural gas business. Skilling was focused less on hard
assets-pipes and energy plants-and more on turning Enron into an asset light
company. Enron began to shed its hard assets in favor of energy trading. 32 Ken
Lay, Enron's CEO, touted the plan in a 1997 interview:
Historically it was thought that natural gas was natural gas was natural
gas. But you also have a lot of risk management or contract issues. Do
customers want to buy short-term or long-term? Do they want to hedge
their risk? Or do they want to go with the market index? Now
everybody can have the kind of portfolio they want, the kind of risk
they want to take, and the kind of exposure they want to price swings.
33
Enron began competing with investment banking houses and became heavily
involved in energy trading, including futures and commodities trading.34 The
shift of Enron from a hard asset company to an asset light company is important
that it could compete economically against coal-fired plants, with far less pollution." Brian
O'Reilly, The Secrets of America's Most Admired Corporations: New Ideas, New Products,
FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1997, at 60. In 1995, 1996, and 1997, Fortune named Enron America's most
innovative company. Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Guiltiest Guys in the Room, FORTUNE,
June 12, 2006, at 26. Further, Enron was taking its strategies worldwide and winning, building
power plants in the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, India and China. The China plant was
150-megawatts. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Enron's Collapse: The Overview; Ripples Spread from
Enron's Expected Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at Cl (stating that "Enron also has big
stakes in... power plants in China, Guam and the Philippines"); Brian O'Reilly, The Power
Merchant: Once a Dull-as-Methane Utility, Enron Has Grown Rich Making Markets Where
Markets Were Never Made Before, FORTUNE, Apr. 17, 2000, at 148, 156 ("Enron roared right
across England and swept into Continental Europe too.... In India, Enron's efforts to build a huge
power plant and gas supply system are arguably changing the way the entire country does
business.").
30. Hurt, supra note 29.
31. See, e.g., Niskanen, supra note 19, at 3 ("The... innovative 'asset light' model [was]
developed for Enron by Jeffrey Skilling."); Tom Fowler, The Fall of Enron: A Year Ago, Enron's
Crumbling Foundation Was Revealed to all when the Company Reported Its Disastrous Third-
Quarter Numbers, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 20, 2002, at Al (discussing the asset light mantra-a
company that owns few hard assets and makes all its money off of trading and services-that
Skillings preached); Dan Piller, Enron Did EOG a Favor by Selling It, FORT-WORTH STAR
TELEGRAM, Jan. 29, 2006 (reporting how the company unloaded so-called hard assets such as
energy production and pipelines); Jennifer Wells, U.S. Courts Reserve the Big Fire for Those at the
Top, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 24, 2006, at Dl (discussing the transformation of Enron from a hard
asset pipeline company to an "asset light" energy trader).
32. Lynn J. Cook, Lessons Learned, HOUS. CHRON., May 30, 2006, at Dl. Ironically, not
only did Kinder take his hard asset mentality with him, he actually took the hard assets. Id. His
current company Kinder Morgan "was birthed from one of Enron's cast-off 'hard assets' that
Kinder's replacement, Jeff Skilling, so despised." Id.
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to the narrative of the Enron scandal because asset light companies find it easier
to hide debt. 35 Simply put, the value of hard assets are difficult to fudge-the
value of an energy plant's equipment and receivables can be precisely
calculated; on the other hand, futures and commodities can become "tools of
fiscal concealment and manipulation."
36
However, even prior to the shift from a hard asset corporation to an asset
light corporation, many of Enron's officers had a reputation for being
cowboys-taking risks and using aggressive accounting. Kinder's leaving and
Skilling's transforming of Enron greatly exacerbated this propensity.3 8 As such,
a perfect storm was brewing. At the same time that Enron's shift to light assets
was making fiscal concealment and manipulation easier, Enron was facing
higher and higher earnings expectations-Enron was "a captive of its own
success."39 Enron was not alone. In the late 1990s, investors gave all attention to
whether a company was meeting analysts' earnings expectations.40 Companies
that missed expectations by as little as a penny found themselves losing as much• ~41 ..
as 6% of their stock value. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Chairman, Arthur Levitt, stated,
This is the pattern earnings management creates: companies try to meet
or beat Wall Street earnings projections in order to grow market
capitalization and increase the value of stock options. Their ability to
do this depends on achieving the earnings expectations of analysts. And
analysts seek constant guidance from companies to frame those
expectations. Auditors, who want to retain their clients, are under
pressure not to stand in the way. 42
35. See Michael A. Hiltzik, Enron's Web of Complex Hedges, Bets, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2002, at Al.
36. Id.
37. Hurt, supra note 29.
38. See Hiltzik, supra note 35 ("[D]erivatives allowed Enron to inflate the value of its assets
and transactions while understating their risks and obscuring their real nature.").
39. Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the
Earnings Game, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 41, 43 (2002).
40. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address to the NYU Center for Law
and Business: The "Numbers Game" (Sept. 28, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
41. Id., discussed in Leonard G. Weld et al., Anatomy of a Financial Fraud, CPA J., Oct.
2004, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2004/1004/essentials/p44.htm ("The
pressure to meet revenue expectations is particularly intense and may be the primary catalyst
leading managers to engage in earnings management practices that result in questionable,
improper, or fraudulent revenue-recognition practices.").
42. Levitt, supra note 40.
[VOL. 60:149
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Within this earnings focused environment, Enron's officers began to focus
"almost exclusively on increasing the level of reported earnings. "4 "Enron was
'laser focused' on shareholder value" and even "had televisions in its elevators
to allow employees to monitor stock prices at all times. ' '+ The problem was,
some of Enron's investments were losing money 45-a fact that was highly
inconvenient to meeting constantly increasing earnings expectations. Enter the
lawyers.
B. The Lawyers' Role
Every lawyer works at the behest of his client, and the client is entitled to
zealous representation-the most aggressive business structure that the law
supports. Indeed, "[t]he ethical obligation to vigorously represent one's client
marches right up to the very brink of what is legal, although it does not go
beyond it.",4 7 The problem is that many corporate lawyers cross that line. They
become "linguistic Houdinis who specialize in hypertechnical arguments as to
43. Niskanen, supra note 19, at 3. Asked at his trial whether there was intense pressure to hit
earnings targets, Mr. Skilling said, "Every company tries to hit their earnings targets. I would hope
we would push. If we weren't pushing then we weren't doing the best job for our shareholders."
Brian Hanney, Enron Trial: Day 42, Accountancymagazine.com, Apr. 19, 2006,
http://www.accountancymagazine.com (follow "News Archive" hyperlink; then follow "All
News" hyperlink; then follow "April 2006" hyperlink).
44. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
1233, 1277 (2003) (citing The Financial Collapse of Enron: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigation of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 11 (2002);
Enron Annual Report 2000, at 2, available at http://picker.uchicago.edu/Enron/
EnronAnnualReport2000.pdf).
45. See Kroger, supra note 3, at 66-67 (citing ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO,
AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 9 (2002); BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST
GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 78, 104, 184, 260
(2003); REBECCA SMITH & JOHN P. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS: HOW Two WALL STREET JOURNAL
REPORTERS UNCOVERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED FAITH IN CORPORATE AMERICA 320
(2003)).
46. See, e.g., William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1457 (2006) ("Stephen
Gillers of New York University Law School said, 'the job of a lawyer is to figure out how to
accomplish the client's objective within the law, and if that can only be done through a
technicality, that is not the lawyers fault."' (citing Patti Waldmeir, Inside Track: Don't Blame the
Laiwyersfor Enron, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2001, at 14)); Ackman, It's the Lawyers' Turn, supra note
21 ("[Attorneys argue] they are only helping the client do what it wants to do as long as it's within
the law.").
47. Julie Hilden, Scummery Judgment: Why Enron's Sleazy Lawyers Walked While Their
Accountants Fried, SLATE, June 21, 2002, http://slate.com (follow the "News & Politics"
hyperlink; then follow the "Jurisprudence" hyperlink; then follow the "View Our Complete
Jurisprudence Archive" hyperlink; then follow the "2002" hyperlink) (emphasis added).
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why their client's rat poison meets the five-part test for being apple pie." 48 Here,
Enron's lawyers tried to pass off Enron's rat poison-debt-as apple pie by
"play[ing] a creative role in structuring and managing some of the company's
controversial 'special purpose' partnershs" and, in the process, all but
"ignore[d] the spirit of ... securities laws." T
Though not present at the planning meetings where the schemes to hide
Enron's debt were devised-likely involving Enron's key officers, lawyers,
accountants, and bankers-one can imagine a scenario where Enron's officers
turned to Enron's lawyers for solutions and queried, "Any idea how to move
some of this debt off our books? How do we make it work?" 51 Whether or not
Enron's lawyers were the primary driving force, 52 the lawyers "played a
creative role in structuring and managing" some of Enron's Special Purpose
Entities (SPEs). 53 In short, it is hard to deny that Enron's lawyers were
intimately involved in deciding to use SPEs to buy poorly performing assets-
loss assets-from Enron.
54
48. France, Lawyer Loophole, supra note 4, at 71; see also France, What About the Lawyers?,
supra note 4, at 59 ("It is still part of the mythology of the profession that lawyers serve as brakes
on bad conduct .... What we have seen in the past 20 years is that client pressures have turned
them into more of a gas pedal.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stephen Gillers,
professor of legal ethics at New York University School of Law).
49. France, One Big Client, supra note 7; see also France, What About the Lawyers?, supra
note 4, at 58 ("[T]here's no way Enron's left hand could have sold so many assets to its right hand
without creative input from both inside and outside counsel.").
50. France, Lawyer Loophole, supra note 4, at 71.
51. See France, One Big Client, supra note 7, at 38 ("One former [Enron] executive ... says
employees would approach [Enron's] lawyers 'and say, "this thing needs to work. How do we
make it work? '").
52. For arguments that the lawyers were the primary driving force, see McNamar, supra note
4, at 184 ("It was not an occasional transaction that might be misunderstood out of context .... );
Ackman, It's the Lawyers' Turn, supra note 21 (noting that Enron's lawyers were "intimately
involved in structuring [Enron's] transactions"); France, What About the Lawyers?, supra note 4
("Enron... manipulate[d] its balance sheet ... [with] cross-disciplinary teams of lawyers,
accountants, and investment bankers."); James Kimberly, States Want Liability Extended for Firms
with Links to Enron, HoUs. CHRON., June 11, 2002, at D3 ("These defendants didn't just sit
back.... They themselves were personally aware of what was happening,.... They participated
in what was happening. In fact, the fraud couldn't have happened without the help of these
defendants."); John Schwartz, Enron's Many Strands: The Lawyers; Troubling Questions Ahead
for Enron's Law Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at C1 ("[Enron] couldn't get past the
conceptual planning stage without calling in the legal architects."). But see McNamar, supra note
4, at 171 ("From a public policy perspective, one of the most vexing challenges is to understand
the role of the corporate lawyer in the Enron collapse.").
53. France, What About the Lawyers?, supra note 4, at 60.
54. See, e.g., McNamar, supra note 17, at 206 ("Enron's SPE transactions all had true sales
opinions from the law firms of Vinson & Elkins or Andrews & Kurth."); France, What About the
Lawyers?, supra note 4, at 58 (noting that Enron's lawyers did "'most of the heavy lifting'
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Using SPEs to hide debt was a four-step process. First, Enron's lawyers
formed the SPE. 55 Second, a major bank financed the SPE with a loan.56 Then,
the SPE used the cash from the loan to purchase loss assets from Enron.
57
Enron's lawyers structured a perfect win-win situation for Enron-Enron got
cash and divested itself of the loss asset. 
58
Next, and important for illustrating the role of Enron's lawyers, in order for
the transferred loss assets not to be consolidated onto Enron's books, Enron's
lawyers drafted "true sale" opinions stating that Enron and the SPE were
separate entities engaged in an arm's length deal.59 In short, Enron' s lawyers
protected the SPE deals from scrutiny by vouching for their legal status.
6
0
However, the above described transaction is not really a true sale. In order
for there to be a true sale, after the transfer the assets "must be 'isolated' or
'remote' from the [selling entity, Enron]. ' 61 That is to say, the selling entity62
cannot be responsible for the debts of the buying entity. But Enron, having
guaranteed the debt in order to entice the bank to make the loan to the SPE, was
ultimately responsible for the SPE's debt. 63 Likewise, the selling entity cannot
implementing the SPEs). A second scheme cooked up for Enron by their lawyers was fraudulent
prepay transactions:
Say, for example, that Enron needed to borrow $1 billion from a bank to meet its
expenses or buy a steel mill in Thailand. Enron could simply borrow the money from a
lender, but this debt [would appear on its financial reports]. To avoid this outcome,
Enron would offer to sell to major financial institutions energy futures for $1 billion. At
the same time, Enron would offer to buy back the same energy futures in one year for,
say, $1.2 billion. The bank would agree to this proposal because for all intents and
purposes the proposed transaction was a loan: the bank would provide Enron $1 billion
for one year, and in return would receive the principal back plus $200 million in interest
once the term of the loan was over.
Kroger, supra note 3, at 73 (internal citations omitted). Enron recorded the $1 billion it borrowed
as "cash flow" and the $1.2 billion it owed as a "price risk management liability" which, to
simplify for our purposes, was not recorded as debt. Id. at 74 (citing Second Interim Report of Neal
Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 42-43, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://www.enron.com/media/2ndExaminersReport.pdf
[hereinafter Batson Second Report]). In the above example, $1 billion in debt disappeared off the
books. Id.
55. France, What About the Latsyers?, supra note 4.
56. McNamar, supra note 17, at 206.
57. Id. at 207. A modification of these " ' sham sales' [was] where the buyers simultaneously
or after a prearranged delay sold back to Enron the same or similar assets at close to the prices they
Ipaid.' These dealings wrongly allowed Enron to report profits on the sales." GEORGE BENSTON ET
AL., FOLLOWING THE MONEY: THE ENRON FAILURE AND THE STATE OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
27 (2003).
58. See McNamar, supra note 17, at 207.
59. Id. at 206.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 204.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 206.
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retain a beneficial stake in the assets sold, but in the case of Enron's SPEs,
Enron entered into a "total return swap," which meant that Enron was entitled to
the profits of the SPEs. 64 In short, the transfer from Enron to its SPEs was
without economic substance; it was an illusion designed to hide debt. 65 There
was no sale, and Enron's lawyers never should have drafted the true sale
opinions.
To place specifics on the general framework described above, consider
Enron's SPE "Whitewing. ' '66 Through asset sales to Whitewing, Enron removed
the debt from its books as follows:
Enron raised money for its Whitewing fund by secretly promising that
Enron itself would repay the raised funds at a future date. Enron then
"sold" assets of limited or decreasing value to the Whitewing fund.
Enron was, in practice, both the buyer and the seller in the deals, and it
remained the true equitable owner of the "warehoused" assets.
However, it treated the transactions as sales. This allowed Enron to
move valueless assets off its books while hiding substantial debt. The
size of these "sales" was ultimately staggering. According to the
bankruptcy examiner, Enron ultimately "sold" some $1.6 billion in




66. Kroger, supra note 3, at 80. Enron also created "Raptor," another SPE, "so that illiquid
investments that managers expected to decline in value could be removed from the company's
financial statements." Simon, supra note 46, at 1455. Eventually, Enron transferred assets on a
"watch" or "troubled" list to the Raptor vehicles. Claire Poole, Skilling Pleads Ignorance, DAILY
DEAL, Apr. 19, 2006, http://www.thedeal.com (subscription required for archived articles).
Specifically,
The Raptors were set up in late 2000 as hedges against the declining value of
investments in other companies. For example, in 1998 Enron invested $28 million in
Rhythms NetConnections. When the Internet service provider's stock went up, it was
worth more than $500 million to Enron. The company then recorded the increase as
revenue even though it didn't sell the stock. Since mark-to-market accounting would
require Enron to report a decrease in Rhythms' share price as a loss, Enron put the stock
into one of the Raptors as a hedge against such a drop. But Enron used its own stock as
its contribution to the partnership, assuming that its own share price would not fall.
When both stocks fell at the same time, the Raptor went bankrupt.
Fowler, supra note 31. For details of other SPEs like "Braveheart" and "Chewco," see In re Enron
Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 614-16, 625, 648-49, 652 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
67. Kroger, supra note 3, at 81-82 (citing Batson Second Report, supra note 54, at 42-43,
76-78); BRYCE, supra note 45, at 156.
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Enron transferred $1.6 billion to Whitewing alone; all told Enron hid $14
billion in debt in SPEs. 69 Enron's lawyers conceived, structured, and carried out
the deals-"[b]y definition, the attorneys have to know the terms of the deal
inside out."70 Any contention that Enron' s lawyers were just following orders is
at best naive and at worst disingenuous.
C. The Accountants
Consider that Enron's lawyers reviewed each disclosure document prepared
by Enron's accountants to make sure that the statements properly
incorporated-or rather, did not incorporate-the losses transferred to the
SPEs.71 In a way, the accountants were mere scriveners-albeit reckless ones-
incorporating the fraudulent schemes into the disclosure documents to be filed
with the SEC.72 Those disclosure documents are "referred to by investors and
securities lawyers as '10-Qs' and '10-Ks,' [and] inform investors about a
company through two different mechanisms." 73 The disclosure documents are
prepared as follows:
First, companies provide a narrative description of their operations and
new initiatives during the relevant reporting period in a "Management' s
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations," or "MD&A." Second, the company supports this narrative
by disclosing hard financial data covering basic performance metrics,
such as the amount of the company's debt, revenue, and cash flow.
Companies are required to report information accurately and in
compliance with "generally accepted accounting principles," or
"GAAP." They are also required to report any additional "material"
information needed to ensure that their disclosures in the MD&A or
metric sections are not misleading. The materiality requirement means,
in practice, that companies must disclose all major developments, both
68. Kroger, supra note 3, at 82 (citing Batson Second Report, supra note 54).
69. McNamar, supra note 17, at 205.
70. France, What About the Latyers?, supra note 4, at 60.
71. In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 616. The accountants worked with the lawyers to reach
the result insisted upon by Enron's directors; the accountants would look at the legal documents
prepared by the lawyers and say, "'Under those circumstances, we can't reach the accounting
result we would like to reach.' . . . [T]he two sides would go back and forth in a collaborative
process driven by 'what the [directors] wanted at the end of the day-for example, to take an asset
offthe balance sheet."' France, What About the Lawyers?, supra note 4, at 61.
72. See Kroger, supra note 3, at 70-71.
73. Id. at 69.
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good and bad. The importance of these publicly filed financial
statements to equity and debt markets cannot be overestimated.
74
Enron was able to defeat the mandatory securities reporting system
established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by drafting the narrative
portion of the reports in such a way that negative financial information-
massive obligations to lenders-was included in footnotes that were incomplete
and "virtually incomprehensible."75 More importantly, the hard financial data
portion of the report-the part that one imagines would be exceedingly difficult
to fudge-did not reflect the debt because of the above described sham
transactions Enron's corporate lawyers structured. 76 At the end of the day,
"investors were not aware that Enron was heavily in debt and losing money fast
for a very simple reason: Enron did not tell them."77 Enron did not tell the
investors about the debt because Enron's lawyers found a way to hide it.
78
Further, while it may be intuitively obvious why Enron's activity-hiding
losses from investors-was morally reprehensible, it may not be as obvious why
the activity violated federal securities laws. As discussed in greater detail in Part
IIB, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section 10(b) allows a wronged
investor to bring an action for damages arising from a misrepresentation or
omission of material fact in connection with the offer or sale of a security.
79
That such an action can be brought against Enron, the corporate entity, is not
debated; however, whether an action can be brought against lawyers that aided
and abetted the fraud pursuant to section 10(b) will be discussed in greater
detail below at Part IJI.B. Section 10(b) states,
74. Id. at 69-71 (internal citations omitted).
75. Batson Second Report, supra note 54, at 55-56.
76. Kroger, supra note 3, at 71.
77. Id. at 69. This was readily apparent during congressional hearings into the collapse of
Enron:
As we have heard over the past several weeks, if the numbers on the financial reports are
meaningless, or if there is widespread gimmickry in use to conceal true financial status
of an enterprise, then we are in deep trouble. If investors cannot rely upon the
information available to them, then the equities markets devolve into little more than
games of chance, where smoke and mirrors prevail over reason and rational decision-
making.
Lessons Learned from Enron's Collapse: Auditing the Accounting Industry: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 67 (2002) (prepared statement of Rep. Tom
Davis).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 52-65.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d
1410, 1417 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The first step for a Rule lOb-5 plaintiff is to establish that defendant
made a materially false or misleading statement or omitted to state a material fact necessary to
make a statement not misleading. Next, plaintiff must establish that defendant acted with scienter
and that plaintiff's reliance on defendant's misstatement cause him or her injury.").
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered .... any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe .... 80
In turn, the SEC promulgated the following rule:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any erson,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
To establish a violation of section 10(b), a plaintiff must show that the
defendant acted with scienter in making the misrepresentation and that the
plaintiff relied on the defendant's misstatement.82 In the case of Enron, the
misrepresentation was the failure, apparently intentional, to disclose losses.
83
Indeed, hiding losses to keep stock prices artificially high is the classic case that
implicates section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.84
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
82. In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d. at 1417. Additionally, in certain similar
circumstances, liability can arise in the absence of scienter or reliance. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(2000) (allowing recovery of purchase price where there is an untrue or misleading or omission of
material fact in the registration statement).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 52-65.
84. See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d. at 1419-20 (stating defendant had
manipulated financial statements through improper and misleading accounting practices in
violation of GAAP in order to achieve their goal of inflating the company's stock price).
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III. REGULATORY AND LIABILITY REGIME FOR LAWYERS PRIOR TO ENRON
A. State and Federal Regulation and Administrative Action
What liability or punishment could have been exacted on Enron's lawyers
for their central role in the scandal? Historically, when a publicly traded
corporation filed false reports with the SEC, lawyers that assisted in the
preparation of the false reports could face sanctions if they violated state ethics
laws-or be barred from the practice of law altogether.85 Most state bar
associations have adopted the language of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: 
86
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or
other person associated with the organization is engaged in action,
intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation
that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation
of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization.... Such measures may include among others:
... referring the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the
highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as
determined by applicable law. 87
However, even if the above Rule is violated, lawyers are self-regulated. 
88
Lawyers decide the sanctions, if any, for their peers' misconduct. 89 The reality
is, few, if any, lawyers face serious repercussions from their state's bar for
aiding and abetting securities fraud because of the limited resources available to
the state's bar coupled with the expense and complexity of a securities fraud
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2000) (amended 2002), discussed in
Darlene M. Robertson and Anthony A. Tortora, Reporting Requirements for Lawyers Under
Sarbanes-Oxley: Has Congress Really Changed Anything?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 785, 790
(2003) (quoting the 1995 version of Model Rule 1.13).
86. See, e.g., ABA Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, Dates of Adoption of the Model Rules of
Prof'l Conduct, www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha-states.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2008) (listing 47
states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands as having adopted the Model Rules).
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (b).
88. McNamar, supra note 4, at 172 ("[Attorneys] are regulated by the state bar association,
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investigation. 90 As one commentator noted, "[bar associations] would much
rather hound paralegals selling cheap wills in strip malls." 91 Further, at the law
firm level, the transition of law firms from general partnerships to limited
liability partnerships reduces the incentive for lawyers to make sure that others
in their firm are not engaging in questionable activity because the lawyers are
only responsible for their own misconduct. 92 In addition, lawyers may actually
benefit from the misconduct of their peers. In 2000 one of Enron's law firms
billed the corporation between $27 million and $30 million, which the firm
distributed to its partners in accordance with the firm's partnership agreement.
93
While lawyer disbarment is exclusively the purview of the states' bars, at
the federal level, the SEC can bar lawyers that assisted in the preparation of the
false report from appearing or practicing before the SEC. 94 This is extremely
rare.95 Even if the SEC barred a lawyer, he could still prepare the documents for• • 96
signature by another lawyer at his firm. Thus, there is no serious threat of
administrative punishment.
B. State and Federal Civil Liability
An alternative deterrent for lawyers who help corporations hide debt is civil
liability.97 However, as explained below, like disbarment, civil liability is rare.
Civil liability at the state level is based on the common law notion of negligent
misrepresentation.98 A lawyer's liability to a third party for damages arising
from a misstatement while the parties are not in privity can only arise where the
relationship is so close as to approach that of privity.99 "Such a requirement is
necessary in order to provide fair and manageable bounds to what otherwise
could be limitless liability." 100 The New York Court of Appeals has stated,
90. See id. at 173.
91. France, Lawyer Loophole, supra note 4, at 70.
92. See McNamar, supra note 4, at 172.
93. See Ackman, Enron's Lawyers, supra note 21; McNamar, supra note 4, at 70. For a
contrary view, that there are reputational repercussions, see Adam C. Pritchard, Should Congress
Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, in AFER ENRON: LESSONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY, supra
note 4, at 125, 131-32.
94. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2008); see also McNamar, supra note 4, at 173 ("The SEC, on
occasion, has barred individual attorneys from SEC work for securities law violations.").
95. McNamar, supra note 4, at 173.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d
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[A]ttorneys, like other professionals, may be held liable for economic
injury arising from negligent representation. Although the defendants in
many of the prior cases addressing this issue have been accountants,
there is no reason to arbitrarily limit the potentially liable defendants to
that class of professionals ... [I]n the right circumstances pecuniary
recovery might be had from lawyers. We now conclude that in
circumstances such as these, a theoretical basis for liability against
legal professionals can be presented. 101
Prudential involved a case where a law firm-for its client's debt
refinancing and for the benefit of its client's creditor-wrote an opinion letter
assuring the creditor of the enforceability of the creditor' s security interest afterS • 102 ••103
the restructuring. It turned out the opinion was wrong. The court
emphasized that "the negligent acts, i.e., the creation of an opinion letter and the
transmission of that letter directly to a third party for the party's own use, were• • , • • ,104
carried out by the lawyer at the client' s express direction. The law firm' s• • • 105
opinion letter was for the benefit of the creditor. As such, the relationship
between the lawyer and the third party was so close as to approach that of
privity, which created a duty running from the attorney to the third party relying
on the opinion letter. 106
However, the court refused to find a breach of duty because of the cautious
terms used in the opinion letter, stating that the factual predicates were not
"independently established" and expressing an "opinion" 107 only that state laws
would not prevent the third party from collecting its debt.108 According to the
court, the use of cautious terms and qualifications was enough to meet the duty
of due care; that is to say, "neither procedural nor substantive
misrepresentations were made."
' 10 9
At the federal level, pursuant to the securities laws (prior to Enron as well
as today) a lawyer could face liability to a private party-a harmed investor-
where the lawyer committed a primary violation of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; however, there is no liability to a private
101. Id.
102. Id. at 319.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 320.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 322.
107. Id. at 323 (emphasis omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 ("It shall be unlawful for any
person ... to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ..... ) (emphasis added).
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party for aiding and abetting securities fraud.111 The primary case that defined
the availability of aiding and abetting liability prior to Enron was Central Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.112 In Central Bank, the Court
decided "whether private civil liability under § 10(b) extends ... to those who
do not engage in the manipulative or deceptive practice, but who aid and abet
the violation."' 113 The secondary actor in question, Central Bank, was an
indenture trustee for bonds issued by the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public
Building Authority. 114 Central Bank learned from its in-house appraiser that the
"appraisal [on the land] appeared optimistic considering the local real estate
market."' 115 As such, Central Bank knew that the bonds themselves were being
offered to the public at an artificially high price. 116 Central Bank decided to
have the land reappraised but delayed independent review of the appraisal until
after the bonds were issued. 
117
The Court found that the purchaser of the bonds could not maintain an
action for aiding and abetting against Central Bank.118 "[T]he statute prohibits
only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of
a manipulative act. The proscription does not include giving aid to a person who
commits a manipulative or deceptive act."1 19 The Court concluded, "[w]e
cannot amend the statute to create liability for acts that are not themselves
manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of the statute."
' 120
However, under Central Bank, a court could find secondary actors, like
lawyers, liable if their acts rise above mere aiding and abetting-where
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006). While there is no private civil cause of action for aiding
and abetting securities fraud under § 78t(e), "[K]nowingly aiding and abetting securities fraud
is... a civil wrong that may be pursued by the SEC." Letter from George M. Cohen, Susan P.
Koniak, David A. Dana & Thomas Ross (endorsed by named academics), to Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (June 2, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-
06/s70806-1 .pdf. Further, there is criminal liability, but prosecuting lawyers for aiding and abetting
is extremely difficult because the prosecutor must demonstrate each element beyond a reasonable
doubt-and it is virtually impossible to prove that a lawyer "kn[e]w[]" anything. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(e).
112. 511 U.S. 164, 175-77 (1994), superseded by statute Private Sec. Litig. Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t (2000)); see also McNamar, supra note 4, at 174 ("Central Bank... has been the most
quoted case on aiding and abetting.").
113. 511 U.S. at 167.
114. Id. Central Bank was not the issuer of the bonds and made no direct statements to the
public about the value of the land securing the bonds. See id. at 168.
115. Id. at 167.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 168.
118. Id. at 175-78.
119. Id. at 177 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 177-78.
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secondary actors commit a primary violation of section 10(b). 121 In other words,
"Central Bank only excludes liability when secondary defendants have made no
false statement [to the injured party] themselves."122 The Court in Central Bank
left an opening in the secondary actor's shield against aiding and abetting
liability, stating,
Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
under § 10(b). The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does
not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free
from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including
a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under lOb-
5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule
10b-5 are met. 123
While there is a possibility of a secondary actor facing liability when it
commits a primary violation, section 10(b), coupled with the Court's decision in
Central Bank, make it very difficult for a private party wronged by securities
fraud to bring an action against a secondary actor, and no action exists for mere
aiding and abetting. 124 While the Central Bank defendant was a bank, the
121. See id. at 177.
122. Pritchard, supra note 93, at 140. However, even then, the liability is only proportional.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) "limited the liability of 'peripheral'
defendants or 'secondary actors' to proportional liability when they lack knowledge of fraud; that
is, the attorneys are only liable for the incremental harm caused by their participation in the fraud."
McNamar, supra note 4, at 174.
123. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
124. In 2002 Judge Melinda Harmon issued an opinion in In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative
& ERISA Litig., which made use of the opening left by Central Bank to find that Enron's lawyers
could be liable for aiding and abetting where they engaged in a primary violation. 235 F. Supp. 2d
549, 590-91 (S.D. Tex. 1992). The following synopsis comes from Anthony Sebok's excellent
summary of the decision.
The motion that prompted the opinion was filed by the... "secondary" defendants,...
alleged to have committed securities fraud.... The motion asked the judge to dismiss
the claims against the secondary defendants, [Enron's lawyers] .... [J]udge
[Harmon] ... allowed the plaintiffs to maintain their federal securities fraud claims
against... [Enron's lawyers].... Under the case law, professionals such as law firms
and accountants need not always be [aiders and abettors]; they can sometimes be
primary actors, too. [Judge Harmon's] reasoning was that Central Bank may have
properly excluded actors who may have conspired to defraud others, but that there is a
difference between helping another commit fraud and "making" a fraud, even if one
makes the fraud (by necessity) by working with others who are also making the
fraud.... [Enron's lawyers were] essentially "a participant making material
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holding is directly applicable to lawyers, who often aid and abet a primary
actor, usually the offeror of the securities. Accordingly, "since 1994 attorneys
have been citing the Central Bank case as the controlling precedent for why
they should have no civil liability under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934."' 125 Among those attorneys using the foregoing defense
were the corporate lawyers in In re Enron.
126
IV. SARBANES-OXLEY RETAINED THE STATUS Quo FOR LAWYERS
Central Bank was an absolute coup for corporate attorneys-it became
virtually impossible to recover a civil judgment from attorneys pursuant to
section 10(b), even where, as in the case of Enron, they cooked up SPEs for the
express purpose of absorbing loss assets which allowed Enron to take those bad
investments off its books. As discussed in Part IV.C, Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. recently confirmed Central Bank's
prohibition against aiding and abetting liability. 
128
A. Show Me the Money: The Death of House Bill 3818-Aiding and
Abetting Liability
It's almost impossible to compete with the effect that money has on
these congressmen.129
In response to the corporate lawyers' role in Enron, Representative John J.
LaFalce introduced House Bill 3818 on February 28, 2002. It aimed to revive
misrepresentations... in order to establish and perpetuate a Ponzi scheme that was
making them all very rich."
Anthony Sebok, The Recent Opinion in the Enron Shareholders' Suit, FINDLAW.COM, Jan.
13, 2003, http://writ.lp.fmdlaw.com/sebok/20030113.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2008). However,
the validity of Judge Harmon's decision has been called into question by the recent Supreme Court
case Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761 (2008).
125. McNamar, supra note 4, at 174.
126. 235 F. Supp. 2d at 587. Judge Harmon eventually dismissed the case against Enron's
lawyers on other grounds after the plaintiffs determined that the lawyers had insufficient funds to
justify the time and expense of pursuing those lawyers. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
ERISA Litig., No. H-01-3624, 2007 WL 209923, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2007); see also Kristen
Hays, Judge Won't Delay Shareholder Suit: Enron Trial Will Go on Without Waiting for Appeal
on Class Action, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 22, 2007, at Cl, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/
story.mpl/special/enron/4571854.html (providing an overview of the Enron lawsuit progression).
127. In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 613-14.
128. 128 S.Ct. at 769.
129. Jane Mayer, The Accountants' War, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 22 & 29, 2002, at 64, 64
(quoting Arthur Levitt, Jr.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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aiding and abetting liability for lawyers by amending § 20 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and statutorily overruling Central Bank.131 The bill
provided,
For purposes of ... an express or implied private right of action under
this title, any person who knowingly or recklessly provides substantial
assistance to another person in the violation of a provision of this title,
or of any rule or regulation thereunder, shall be deemed to violate such
provision and shall be liable to the same extent as the person to whom
such assistance is provided. 132
Representative LaFalce explained that House Bill 3818 would restore aiding
and abetting liability and "would provide a private right of action against
anyone (auditors, lawyers, and other outside professionals) who knowingly or
recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of the
securities laws." 
133
House Bill 3818 was referred to the House Committee on Financial
Services (Financial Services Committee), where it was to be marked up by
those representatives with expertise in the subject matter and then returned to
the entire House for an up or down vote. 13 4 However, the thirty-seven
Republicans that formed the majority on the Financial Services Committee
received over $1.2 million from corporate lawyers during that election cycle-
ten times the amount contributed by business associations, which represent the
interests of corporate officers (approximately $100,000). Those contributions
were significantly more than accountants (approximately $800,000). 13 5 Not
131. Id. § 14(a).
132. Id. § 14(b). The bill also provided an affirmative defense: "No person shall be liable
under this subsection based on an omission or failure to act unless such omission or failure
constituted a breach of a duty owed by such person." Id. Because the bill never became law, there
is no judicial interpretation of the troublesome language. A plain reading is that the language
would have shielded a lawyer from liability when the lawyer's actions were reasonable.
133. 148 CONG. REC. E223 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2002) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (emphasis
added).
134. JUDY SCHNEIDER, HOUSE COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION AND PROCESS: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW 3 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS20465, Feb. 25,
2005), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/RS20465.pdf (describing the process of
committee markup).
135. Part IV infra discusses why accountants' significant contributions were less effective
than lawyers' contributions in gaining access to the politicians' ear. See generally Lawyers/Law
Firms Industry Profile 2002, http://www.opensecrets.org (follow "influence & Lobbying"
hyperlink; then follow "Lobbying" hyperlink; then follow "industries" hyperlink; then follow
"Alphabetical Listing of Industries" hyperlink; then follow "Lawyers/Law Firms" hyperlink; then
follow "2002" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 29, 2008) (statistics compiled by and on file with the
author). For a similar compilation of corporate lawyers' campaign contributions to the relevant
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surprisingly, the Financial Services Committee appears to have protected
lawyers by not acting on the bill. They wielded their "blocking power"-if
committee members disfavor the bill for any reason, they can do nothing andS 136
allow the bill to languish in committee. Commentators have observed that to
the extent campaign contributions can affect legislation, it often happens at the
committee level where it is less observable. 137 This appears to be exactly what
happened to House Bill 3818.
The only way that Representative LaFalce could revive House Bill 3818
was via a seldom used procedural move-a discharge petition. 138 The discharge
petition is a "mechanism by which any majority can force the floor to consider
legislation without approval from the committee of jurisdiction" thereby
discharging the committee from its duty.139 On July 10, 2002, Representative
conference committee, see infra note 148 and accompanying text. Looking only at contributions
given to Republicans prevents artificially inflating the corporate lawyer contribution figure by
including plaintiffs' bar contributions. That the trial lobby was for the renewal of aiding and
abetting liability is well documented: "Earlier this year, the trial lawyers mounted a full-court press
on Capitol Hill to revise the PSLRA, working through the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America and the National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys, the trade
group for law firms that specialize in litigating class-action securities fraud suits." Shawn Zeller,
Holding the Line on Investor Lawsuits, NAT'L J., July 27, 2002, at 2255, 2256. "it is plausible to
assume that of those funds [lawyers] contributed, the Democrats received contributions principally
from the plaintiffs' bar while corporate law firms' contributions went to Republicans." Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance 197 (YALE
UNIV. INT'L CTR. FOR FIN., Working Paper No. 04-37, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101 [hereinafter Romano, Working Paper]. This contention is
supported by the Center for Responsive Politics, which states that overwhelmingly "corporate
lawyers (corporate law firms) ... give to Republicans." Id. at 194 n.384. As to why lawyers (as a
group) gave a far greater amount than higher earning corporate executives, one can only posit that
the number of lawyers in the United States far outweighs the number of corporate executives.
136. Romano, Working Paper, supra note 135, at 196 (discussing KENNETH A. SHEPSLE AND
MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 338
(1997)).
137. Id.
138. Ren6 Lindstadt & Andrew D. Martin, Discharge Petition Bargaining in the House,
1995-2000, at 4 (Mar. 27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://adrnwustl.edu/media/working/rladmmpsa.pdf.
139. Id. at 3. As Rule 15 of the Rules of the House of Representatives sets forth:
(b)(1) A Member may present to the Clerk a motion in writing to discharge-
(A) a committee from consideration of a public bill or public resolution that has
been referred to it for 30 legislative days; or
(B) the Committee on Rules from consideration of a resolution that has been
referred to it for seven legislative days and that proposes a special order of business
for the consideration of a public bill or public resolution that has been reported by
a standing committee or has been referred to a standing committee for 30
legislative days.
(2) Only one motion may be presented for a bill or resolution....
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LaFalce and Representative Carson filed a motion to discharge the Committee
from consideration of House Bill 3818. 14 The petition received only 161 of theS 141
required 218 signatures, and not surprisingly, no committee member who
received contributions from corporate lawyers signed the petition.
142
Representative LaFalce knew the score-the opposition was "too strong, too
powerful, too influential." 143 That is the "governmental process as it really
works, as opposed to you know how it is supposed to work." 144
(c) . . . When a majority of the total membership of the House [218 Members] shall
have signed the motion, it shall be entered on the Journal, published with the signatures
thereto in the Record, and referred to the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees.
(d)(2) When a motion to discharge is called up, the bill or resolution to which it relates
shall be read by title only. The motion is debatable for 20 minutes, one-half in favor of
the motion and one-half in opposition thereto.
(e)(1) If a motion prevails to discharge the Committee on Rules from consideration of
a resolution, the House shall immediately consider the resolution, pending which the
Speaker may entertain one motion that the House adjourn. After the result of such a
motion to adjourn is announced, the Speaker may not entertain any other dilatory motion
until the resolution has been disposed of. If the resolution is adopted, the House shall
immediately proceed to its execution.
Rules of the House of Representatives, R. XV, H.R. Doc. No. 108-241, at 658 (2005).
140. H.R. 479, 107th Cong. (2002).
141. See H.R. 479.
142. Compare Motion to Discharge a Committee from the Consideration of a Resolution,
H.R. PETITION No. 107-09, at 1 (2002) (listing House of Representatives members who signed the
petition), with House Financial Services Committee, Archived Committee Membership,
http://fmancialservices.house.gov/archive membership.html, (follow "Members from the 107th
Congress" hyperlink) (listing members of the House Financial Services Committee from the 107th
Congress), and Chart of Campaign Contributions (Nov. 2008) (on file with author) (compiling list
of campaign contributions to members of the House Financial Services Committee).
143. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act of 2002:
Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 166 (2002) (statement of
Rep. John LaFalce) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3763]. Other bills intending to return aiding and
abetting liability for lawyers failed as well. See, e.g., Stop Enablers of Fraud Act, H.R. 5625, 107th
Cong. (2002) (aiming to "restore aiding and abetting liability under the Federal securities laws");
Shareholder and Employee Rights Restoration Act of 2002, H.R. 3829, 107th Cong. (2002)
(aiming to "repeal the provisions of the [securities laws] that limit private securities actions"). In
the Senate, Senator Richard C. Shelby introduced Senate Bill 1933 "to amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933, to address liability standards in connection
with violations of the federal securities laws." Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. 1933, 107th
Cong. (2002). The bill was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on
February 12, 2002, id., which refused to act on it. Five months later, Senator Shelby again
attempted to pass aiding and abetting liability for lawyers, this time as an amendment to Sarbanes-
Oxley itself. 148 Cong. Rec. S6673, S6673-74 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) (submitted by Sen.
Shelby). A cloture vote prevented the amendment from being considered. See, e.g., Otis Bilodeau,
Senate Fires out Proposals that Target Lawyers, RECORDER (San Francisco), July 15, 2002, at 1
("A cloture vote on [Senate Amendment 4261] on Friday appeared to lessen Shelby's chances of
[VOL. 60:149
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Roberta Romano of Yale Law School seconded the above explanation: "It
is possible that Congress' [s] more accommodating attitude toward the
regulation of the legal, compared to the accounting, profession was affected by
its larger contributions to committee members. Professor Romano' s careful
words betray the fact that it cannot be directly proven that a particular• 146
contribution buys any action or nonaction on the part of a lawmaker. On the
other hand, "[c]ontributions are widely understood as providing donors with
access (the 'politician's ear')" even if "there is little consensus on whether they
purchase anything else." 147 Over $1 million from one group surely would affect
a lawmaker's decisions. 
148
succeeding. The parliamentary maneuver restricts the Senate from taking up amendments deemed
not germane to the underlying bill.").
144. Hearing on H.R. 3763, supra note 143.
145. Romano, Working paper, supra note 135, at 198. Professor Romano was looking at the
issue of contribution influence on Sarbanes-Oxley generally, and she focused on the conference
committee that reconciled the House and Senate Bill. Id. at 185-86. Though Professor Romano
believes "we can ... only consider campaign contributions in a qualitative analysis, in relation to
committee actions with regard to SOX," her findings are analogous to the consideration of House
Bill 3818. Id. at 186. She found that corporate lawyers gave $790,947 to Republicans on the
conference committee. Id. at tbl.8 That is seven times as much as given by business associations
and twice as much as given by accountants. See id. (noting that Republicans on the House
Committee received $119,963 frombusiness associations and $439,222 from accountants).
146. See Romano, Working paper, supra note 135, at 185.
147. Id. at 185 ("The connection, if any, between campaign contributions and legislative
decision making is a matter of considerable controversy in the political science literature.").
According to Romano,
[D]ifferences in conclusions regarding the impact of contributions on votes depend on
whether in the model tested the campaign contributions variable is significant after
controlling for economic interests. If the policy views of contributors match those of the
legislators' voting constituents, then the effect of campaign contributions is not of any
particular importance politically.
Id. at 186 n.368. For a further discussion of the relationship between legislative decisionmaking
and campaign contributions, see SAMUEL KERNELL AND GARY C. JACOBSON, THE LOGIC OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 421 (2d ed. 2003); SEPSLE AND BONCHEK, supra note 136, at 338.
148. This does not even take into account the lobbying power of lawyers separate and apart
from contributions, which is concentrated in the American Bar Association (the ABA), and its
powerful lobbying arm, the Governmental Affairs Office (the GAO). See American Bar
Association, Governmental Affairs Office Homepage, http://www.abanet.org/poladv [hereinafter
GAO Homepage] (last visited Sept. 29, 2008). "The GAO coordinates the Association's
Washington activities, and all representation on behalf of the ABA before governmental entities or
officials must be coordinated with and through the GAO." GAO Homepage About Us,
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/about.htnil. The GAO opened its doors in Washington, D.C. in 1957
and its 850 person staff "serves as the focal point for the Association's advocacy efforts before
Congress." GAO Homepage. Last year the GAO lobbied Congress on more than one hundred
issues. Id. As one commentator stated, "[n]o one on Capitol Hill blinks when representatives of the
[GAO] show up to testify at congressional hearings on an array of issues affecting the justice
system and the legal profession." Rhonda McMillion, 50-Year-Dash: The ABA's Lobbying Efforts
Have Grown up Since a Modest Start in 1957, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2007, at 66. In 2002, the GAO spent
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Once corporate lawyers have purchased the politician's ear, they have an
additional advantage-in the 107th Congress over one-third of Representatives
in the House were lawyers, 149 and importantly, 43% of the members of the
Financial Services Committee were lawyers including the chairman, Michael
Oxley. 15 As such, it is reasonable to believe that corporate lawyers faced a
receptive audience for their arguments against House Bill 3818. The influence
of lawyers upon legislation is not a recent phenomenon but a historical truism:
"We know ... that lawyers have accounted for ... a majority of the members of
the United States Senate and United States House of Representatives .... [y]et
lawyers have never constituted more than .2% of the United States labor,,151 ••,
force. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "[lawyers] consequently exercise
a powerful influence upon the formation of the law."152 De Tocqueville further
observed,
the lawyers of the United States form a party which is but little feared
and scarcely perceived, which has no badge peculiar to itself, which
adapts itself with great flexibility to the exigencies of the time and
accommodates itself without resistance to all the movements of the
more than $1.3 million lobbying Congress. Lawyers/Law Firms Industry Profile 2002: The
American Bar Association, http://www.opensecrets.org (follow "influence & Lobbying" hyperlink;
then follow "Lobbying" hyperlink; then follow "industries" hyperlink; then follow "Alphabetical
Listing of Industries" hyperlink; then follow "Lawyers/Law Firms" hyperlink; then follow "2002"
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 29, 2008). Lawyers present a disciplined and focused force in the form
of the GAO. The power the lawyers' lobby can muster to influence legislation has been
commented on at length. See, e.g., David R. Derge, The Lawyer as Decision-Maker in the
American State Legislature, 21 J. POL. 408, 409 (1959) (examining the lawyer's role in state
legislatures); Robert M. Howard, Wealth, Power, and Attorney Regulation in the U.S. States:
License Entry and Maintenance Requirements, 28 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Fall 1998, at 24, 32,
(examining the influence that attorneys have on state legislatures). But see, e.g., Robert L. Nelson
& John P. Heinz, Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in Washington, 22 LAW & SoC'Y REV.
237 (1988) (finding that lawyers do not enjoy the level of influence that popular images suggest).
149. Lawyers constituted 53% of Senators and 36% of House Representatives, respectively,
in the 107th Congress. Michael B. Kelly, Who Knows?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 841, 845 n.10
(2005) (internal citations omitted).
150. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-2006, at 1690
(Andrew R. Dodge & Betty K. Koed eds., 2005).
151. David R. Derge, The Lawyer in the Indiana General Assembly, 6 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI.
19, 19 (1962); see also M. Louise Rutherford, Lawyers as Legislators, 195 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. ScI. 53, 53 (1938) ("[In the 1930s] the percentage of lawyers in the Senate ranged
from 61 to 76, [and in] the House, the percentage of lawyers ranged from 56 to 65."); Richard S.
Wells, The Legal Profession and Politics, 8 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 166, 167-71 (1964) (discussing
Derge's work). But see Robert L. Nelson et al., Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in
Washington, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 237, 293-95 (1988) (arguing against any correlation between
lawyers' influence and governmental policy).
152. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 279.
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social body .... [l]t acts upon the country imperceptibly, but finally
fashions it to suit its own purposes.
153
The imperceptibility of the lawyers' role in the Enron scandal served the
attorneys well as they were not in the spotlight. 154 The business press seemed
not to recognize the corporate lawyers' role in the Enron scandal; 155 lawyers
were able to bring their influence to bear on Congress 156-House Bill 3818
never had a chance of making it out of the Financial Services Committee, let
alone passing.
B. The Death of "Up and Out" Reporting
In the aftermath of Enron, legal commentators also began to discuss the
possibility of requiring lawyers to "report up" wrongdoing to the board of
directors and, in some instances, "report out" wrongdoing to the SEC. 157 A
letter from numerous law professors to the SEC argued that "in certain
circumstances a lawyer also should be required to do more than report to a
client's board of directors," that is, "report both to the client's directors and
simultaneously to the SEC an illegal act if senior management fails to take
remedial action."158 Senator John Edwards joined this call for greater lawyer
accountability and argued that the role of lawyers should be examined "[i] n the
wake of the Enron scandal 159going so far as to propose an amendment to
Sarbanes-Oxley that would require lawyers to report officers' violations of the
153. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
154. See Hearing on H.R. 3763, supra note 143.
155. See discussion supra Part I.B.
156. Id.
157. See Letter from Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law at Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, to
Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 7, 2002), available at http://
www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/pitt.pdf (letter endorsed by Professor Painter and
thirty-nine other law professors). Professor Painter's letter and the SEC's response are discussed in
Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the
Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 524-25 (2003).
Of course, proposals to impose a duty on lawyers to report out are not new. See, e.g., Frederick D.
Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438
(1974) ("The SEC has signaled its intention to impose upon lawyers an obligation to the securities
market in releases, speeches and most significantly, in increasingly frequent suits against lawyers
and law firms.").
158. Painter, supra note 157.
159. Letter from John Edwards, U.S. Senator from N.C., to Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. &
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securities laws to corporate directors. 16 The lawyers' response to Senator
Edwards was incredulity. A letter from the ABA read,
For over 200 years, the legal profession has been regulated almost
exclusively by the judicial branch of government, and today, judicial
regulation of lawyers is a principle firmly established in every state....
[W]e believe that changes in this ethical rule, if any, ultimately should
be accomplished through the adoption of new state court rules, not
through federal legislation or federal agency regulations. 161
One can almost hear the confusion at the ABA upon receiving Senator
Edwards's letter: "Isn't he one of us? What is he doing?" In response to
pressure, Senator Edwards punted-his amendment deferred the responsibility
for implementing greater lawyer accountability to the SEC:
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, the
Commission shall establish rules, in the public interest and for the
protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional
conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission
in any way in the representation of public companies, including a rule
requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof) and, if the
counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions
with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the
evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors or to another
committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the company, or to the board of
directors. 162
In fairness, in the above language, Congress and Senator Edwards do set
forth some guidance for the SEC, but any reference to reporting out is absent. In
160. 148 CONG. REC. S6552, S6552-59 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Edwards).
161. Letter from Robert Hershon, President, Ain Bar Ass'n, to John Edwards, U.S. Senator
from N.C. (June 20, 2002), available at www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/107th/
business062002.html.
162. 148 CONG. REC. S6552, S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)
(quoting the language of his proposed amendment).
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fact, the above language does not direct the SEC to change anything. 163 One
commentator observed,
[T]he language of Section 307 does not give the Commission the
authority to impose any obligations on lawyers beyond those which
have long been required of them by courts, the Model Rules, and the
Restatement. In addition to the language of Section 307, the legislative
history supports the conclusion that Congress did not authorize the
Commission to impose any new obligations on attorneys. In particular,
in discussing Section 307 Senator [Edwards] stated that it "basically
instructs the SEC to start doing exactly what they were doing 20 years
ago, to start enforcing this up-the-ladder principle." The drafters
intended only to remind lawyers of their existing duties and ensure that
the Commission and the ABA are appropriately enforcing those
duties. 164
While the SEC has historically been content to defer to the "strong view
among the bar that these matters are more appropriately addressed by state bar,,165 ... 166
rules, the SEC did propose a noisy withdrawal requirement -surprising
163. Darlene M. Robertson & Anthony A. Tortora, Reporting Requirements for Lawyers
Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Has Congress Really Changed Anything?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 785,
788 (2003).
164. Id. at 787-88 (internal citations omitted); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J.
Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
299, 315-16 (2004) (arguing that section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley merely gave the SEC tools to
enlist corporate counsel in fraud prevention).
165. Letter from David Becker, Gen. Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to Richard W. Painter,
Professor of Law at Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law (Mar. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/becker.pdf. The pertinent portion of the
letter stated:
As yo[u] are aware, since the Carter and Johnson Rule 102(e) proceeding, 47 SEC 471
(1981), the Commission has not brought Rule 102(e) proceedings against lawyers based
on allegations of improper professional conduct, or otherwise used the Rule to establish
professional responsibilities of lawyers. There has been a strong view among the bar that
these matters are more appropriately addressed by state bar rules, which historically
have been the source of professional responsibility requirements for lawyers, and have
been overseen by state courts. As you noted in the 1996 SMU Law Review article which
you enclosed, there may be reasons to prefer having one uniform nation-wide rule
governing lawyers who participate in nation-wide securities law practices; but there are
also good reasons why consideration of such a significant change in established practice
should be undertaken in the context of Congressional legislation, as opposed to agency
rulemaking. As I understand it, your 1996 article concludes that any such changes to the
rules governing lawyers should be the result of Congressional changes to the securities
laws, analogous to Section 10A's rules for accountants.
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many. The lawyers wasted no time in opposing it-arguing that "mandating
noisy withdrawal as originally proposed in Section 205.3(d)(1) would...
[d]estroy issuers' trust and confidence in their attorneys by creating conflicts
between the attorney's personal interest" and the client's best interest;
"[e]ncourage issuers to avoid consulting with attorneys on close issues or to
withhold necessary facts when they do consult attorneys"; "[r]emove the
flexibility attorneys need to have in order to counsel clients effectively on
compliance with law in complex matters"; and "[e]ncourage premature
withdrawal by attorneys in order to escape the mandatory noisy withdrawal
threshold rather than encourage them to continue to counsel on difficult issuesS ,167
when the issuer most needs their services. In the end, like Congress, the SEC
backed down-electing to assuage lawyers. 168 The SEC's final rule does not
Id. For a full treatment of the exchange, see Thomas D. Morgan, Sarbanes-Oxley: A Complication,
Not a Contribution, in the Effort to Improve Corporate Lawyers' Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETIcs 1, 13-14 (2003).
166. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg.
71,670, 71,673 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002). The SEC also proposed Part 205:
Proposed § 205.3(d) would [have] follow[ed] §§ 205.3(b) and (c) as adopted, which set
forth the duty of a lawyer to report evidence of a material violation up-the-ladder of the
issuer's governance structure, and, if appropriate, to explain to the issuer his or her
reasons for believing that the issuer has not made a timely or appropriate response.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6326 n.32
(proposed Feb. 6, 2003). Proposed section 205.3(d) read:
(d) Notice to the Commission where there is no appropriate response within a
reasonable time. (1) Where an attorney who has reported evidence of a material
violation under paragraph 3(b) of this section rather than paragraph 3(c) of this section
does not receive an appropriate response, or has not received a response in a reasonable
time, to his or her report, and the attorney reasonably believes that a material violation is
ongoing or is about to occur and is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of the issuer or of investors:
(i) An attorney retained by the issuer shall:
(A) Withdraw forthwith from representing the issuer, indicating that the
withdrawal is based on professional considerations;
(B) Within one business day of withdrawing, give written notice to the
Commission of the attorney's withdrawal, indicating that the withdrawal was
based on professional considerations; and
(C) Promptly disaffirm to the Commission any opinion, document,
affirmation, representation, characterization, or the like in a document filed
with or submitted to the Commission, or incorporated into such a document,
that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and that the attorney
reasonably believes is or may be materially false or misleading[.]
Id. at 6326.
167. Letter from Alfred P. Carlton Jr., President, Ai Bar Ass'n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 4-5 (Apr. 2, 2003) [hereinafter ABA Letter to the SEC], available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/second-comment.pdf.
168. As reported in Congress Daily:
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require corporate lawyers to report violations to the SEC or to effectuate noisy
withdrawal.169 Like House Bill 3818, the lawyers defeated noisy withdrawal and
mandatory reporting requirements at the rulemaking level as well.
C. The Practical Effect of Failing to Pass House Bill 3818-Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
The above discussion is not merely an academic frolic into how lawyers can
usurp a representative democracy. The Supreme Court's decision in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. illustrates the very real
impact of Congress's failure to act on House Bill 3818.170 In Stoneridge
Investment Partners, plaintiffs asked the Court to do what House Bill 3818
failed to do-limit its prior decision in Central Bank of Denver and revive a... ... .171
private cause of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud. The facts of
Stoneridge Investment Partners are straightforward. 172 Charter Communications
(Charter) was facing an operating cash flow shortfall of over $15 million. 173
Charter did not want to disclose this shortfall on its financial statements filed
The SEC also assuaged attorneys by delaying rules they said would force them to
"tattle" on their corporate clients. At issue is a section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act written
by Sen. John Edwards, D-N.C. It directs corporate attorneys to go "up the ladder" in
their clients' firms in reporting evidence of wrongdoing. Lawyers thought the SEC's
initial rule well exceeded Congress' intent. They were especially peeved over a
provision requiring lawyers who did not get a satisfactory response to their reports from
corporate governors to make a "noisy withdrawal" by reporting to the SEC. However, in
a ruling last month, the SEC modified the provisions to narrow the circumstances in
which attorneys would be required to withdraw from representation. The SEC also gave
corporate lawyers a 60-day extension to continue lobbying against the "noisy
withdrawal" - a campaign many observers believe will be successful - and voted to
propose a "silent withdrawal" alternative.
Pamela Barnett, Remnants of Biz Reform May Return, Congress Daily, Feb. 10, 2003, available at
2003 WLNR 13660625.
169. Implementing of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296,
6296 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2003)), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/fmal/33-8185.htm; see also Beverley Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The New
World of Risk for Corporate Attorneys and Their Boards Post-Sarbanes- Oxley: An Assessment of
Impact and a Prescription for Action, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 185, 187-188 (2005) ("Despite the
initial proposals by the SEC in November 2002, which included the requirement that attorneys
report suspected violations out to the SEC (the so-called 'noisy withdrawal' provision), part 205
does not actually include those more controversial requirements.").
170. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
171. Id. at 766; see supra text accompanying notes 133-143.
172. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766-76. For a detailed statement of the facts, see Brief for
Petitioner at 4-12, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761
(2008) (No. 06-43), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/06-
43_Petitioner.pdf.
173. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766.
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with the SEC out of fear that the disclosure could have a negative impact on its
stock price. 174 As such, Charter agreed with one of its suppliers, Scientific-
Atlanta, that it would overpay Scientific-Atlanta $20 for cable boxes it
purchased. 175 Scientific-Atlanta agreed to "return the overpayment by
purchasing advertising from Charter."' 176 Charter capitalized the additional cost
of the cable boxes, and the advertising proceeds added to Charter's finances as
revenue even though, in reality, there was no economic significance to the
transaction. 177 This allowed Charter to meet its revenue projections. 178
Of course, like Enron's, Charter's house of cards eventually collapsed.
Charter's investors lost hundreds of millions of dollars when Charter had to
restate its financials and sued Scientific-Atlanta for aiding and abetting
Charter's fraud. 17 9 The Court rejected the investors' aiding and abetting suit,
holding that "[t]he § 10(b) implied private right of action does not extend to
aiders and abettors." 180 Instead, there is only liability for "secondary actors who
commit primary violations." 181 The plaintiff must show that the secondary actor
meets each of the elements that is applicable to a primary actor facing section
10(b) liability: "(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant;
(2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or
omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation."182 Thus, the Court
reaffirmed Central Bank, finding that there is no liability absent a deceptive
statement or conduct relied upon by the investor. 183
Important in the Court's determination was Congress's failure to pass
House Bill 3818 in the aftermath of Enron. The Court wrote,
Were we to adopt this construction of § 10(b) [allowing aiding and
abetting liability], it would revive in substance the implied cause of





178. Id. A similar scheme was worked out between Charter and Motorola, where Charter
would pay Motorola $20 in liquidated damages for any cable boxes it did not buy, with the
understanding that Charter would fail to buy a given number. Motorola agreed to return the
liquidated damages by purchasing advertising from Charter. Again, Charter added the advertising
proceeds to its fmancials as revenue, which allowed it to meet its revenue projections. Id. at 767.
179. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 172, at 9.
180. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
181. Id. at 773-74 (citing Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. 164, 191 (1994)).
182. Id. at 768.
183. Id. at 768-69.
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deceptive act in the process of facilitating the fraud; and we would
undermine Congress'[s] determination that this class of defendants
should be pursued by the SEC and not by private litigants.
84
That exact point was, of course, the centerpiece of Scientific-Atlanta's and
Motorola's briefs. "Congress revisited the issue again in 2002 when it
considered the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Some legislators argued in favor of
amending the 1934 Act to subject aiders and abettors to private suits....
[However, as passed] it did not extend private civil liability to aiders and
abettors."' 185 And,
In 2002, Congress again considered and rejected efforts to extend the
private right of action to reach aiders and abettors. Senator Shelby
proposed an amendment to the bill that became the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 that would have added a "private litigation" provision stating
that "persons that aid or abet violations ... shall be deemed to be in
violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom
such assistance is provided." No such provision appears in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.186
In short, Congress's failure to act on House Bill 3818 to amend section
10(b) effectively shields corporate lawyers from aiding and abetting liability.
V. SARBANES-OXLEY HAMMERED CORPORATE OFFICERS AND ACCOUNTANTS
A. The Weakened Business and Accounting Lobby
In the immediate aftermath of Enron, the business lobby and the
accountanting lobby virtually shut down because of increased press scrutiny
184. Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
185. Brief for Respondents at 4, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/
briefs/pdfs/07-08/06-43_Respondent.pdf.
186. Brief for Business Roundtable as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16 n.2,
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363259 (quoting 148 CONG. REC. S6584 (2002)
(statement of Sen. Shelby)). See also H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 54 (2002) (minority view
observing that the SEC and others had urged Congress to overturn Central Bank's bar on private
suits against aiders and abettors and lamenting that Congress did not "now heed these
recommendations" to expand the private right of action). During oral arguments before the
Supreme Court, the Court was highly skeptical of its ability to reevaluate its position in Central
Bank absent congressional action-at oral argument "the [C]ourt appeared strongly inclined to
leave it to Congress to define the circumstances under which secondary players.., can be sued."
Linda Greenhouse, Skeptically, Court Hears Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, at Cl.
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(compared to the lack of press scrutiny of lawyers' role in the Enron scandal). 
187
Commentators observed, "[T]he collapse of Enron and its auditor, Arthur
Anderson, politically weakened key groups affected by the legislation, the
business community and the accounting profession."188 And if Enron weakened
the business and accounting lobbies, WorldCom killed them. One insider
recalls,
There are limits to even the best lobbying. The day after the June
25 revelation that WorldCom Inc. had misled investors with $3.9
billion in faulty accounting, what had been a tepid corporate
accountability bill suddenly turned into a serious effort to regulate the
accounting industry. Ultimately, the Sarbanes-Oxley bill became the
most sweeping corporate regulatory reform since the Depression.
"Lobbying effectively stopped the day WorldCom hit," says one
lobbyist heavily involved in the bill. "I had a meeting on the Hill that
day, and people were literally calling me, saying, 'Do you still want to
meet?' ,19
And "as a lobbyist for the Chamber of Commerce ... put it, '[w]hen the
WorldCom scandal hit, it became, to me, a bit of a-a very different attitude
and atmosphere, if not a political tsunami."'' 190 All of a sudden, Congress
needed "the most sweeping corporate reforms since the Great Depression, 191
and the path of least resistance for Congress was through the corporate officers
and accountants.
As noted above, accountants did contribute a significant amount to
members of the Financial Services Committee-approximately $800,000.192
However, due to the press scrutiny, and the fact that they had just been caught
red handed shredding Enron documents, 193 the accountants could not take
187. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. Corporate lawyers were able to bring their
influence to bear on Congress in the spring of 2002 in large part because few people knew the
central role they had played. The lawyers "who provide the brains, the talent, and often the
motivation, behind a fraud... avoid[ed] responsibilities to the victims simply because their
appearance was not made visible to the investing public, and sadly, that's the state of the law that
we have today." Hearing on H.R. 3763, supra note 143, at 140.
188. Romano, supra note 8, at 1528.
189. Top of Their Game: Lobby Leaders in 2002, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at 14, 16.
190. Romano, supra note 8, at 1567 (quoting World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast
July 24, 2002)).
191. Carrie Johnson, Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Measure Under Attack, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2005, at Cl.
192. See supra text accompanying note 135.
193 Bamaby J. Feder & Michael Brick, Enron Says Shredding of Records Was Not Stopped
Until Recently, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Al.
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advantage of access to the politician's ear-even if campaign contributions
bought such access-and certainly not with the same success that lawyers
obtained in defeating House Bill 3818.194
B. Officer Bars
The first casualties of Sarbanes-Oxley were officers; specifically, through
the vehicle of section 305 of Sarbanes-Oxley, "Officer and Director Bars and
Penalties," Congress made it easier for the SEC to administratively prohibit a• • 195
person from serving as an officer or director under appropriate circumstances.
Before explaining what the law is as it pertains to officer and director bars, it is
important to discuss what the law was, or perhaps more accurately, how the
concept of officer and director bars evolved over time. Indeed, officer and
director bars are an old idea simply waiting for the right time to be revived.
Felix Frankfurter, James Landis, Benjamin Cohen, and Thomas G.
Corcoran wrote the Securities Act of 1933196 over a weekend and a case of
Scotch 197 in response to a belief that investment bankers, brokers, dealers,
corporate directors, and accountants had systematically overreached and
cheated the American public out of their hard earned money during the 1920s-
causing the Great Depression. 198 Fully half of all securities floated during this
period were worthless, "and [those] cold figures spell[ed] tragedy in the lives of
thousands of individuals who [had] invested their life savings, accumulated
after years of effort, in [those] worthless securities. 199
The model for the Securities Act was the English Companies Act (the
Companies Act).200 Years later, Landis recounted the fierce debate over whether
to incorporate section 217 of the Companies Act which allowed courts to bar
directors. 20 1 In the end, it was left out of the Securities Act. 20 2 Officer and
194. See supra text accompanying notes 136-144.
195. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 305, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
196. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (2000)).
197. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1227 (1999).
198. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2-3 (1933); see also James Landis, The Legislative History
of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 30 (1959) (arguing the Securities Act of
1933 was implemented in response to the American public's loss of faith in securities institutions
following the high financing of the 1920s and the stock market crash of 1929).
199. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
200. Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23 (Eng.); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
513 U.S. 561, 599 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The drafters of the Securities Act modeled
this federal legislation on the British Companies Act.").
201. Landis, supra note 198, at 48. Sections 8 and 9 of the Company Directors
Disqualification Act, which set forth in great detail when a court can bar a director, superseded
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director bars were viewed as too drastic and too draconian a remedy, and the
focus of the Act was on making sure investors had the information they needed
to make sound investment decisions, not on punishing corporate principals.
20 3
Fifty years later, in 1985, James C. Treadway Jr., then Commissioner of the
SEC, gave a speech entitled Looking for the Perfect Enforcement Remedy. 204 In
his speech, Treadway tried to revive officer and director bars, arguing they were
authorized under what one might call an implied SEC right of action; that is to
say, inherent in the securities laws is an SEC right to bar officers and directors:
Section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act .... may empower the
Commission to issue administrative orders barring individuals who
"cause" issuers to violate reporting, proxy, and recordkeeping
requirements from holding corporate office. Section 15 (c)(4) has
always authorized the Commission to require compliance "upon such
terms and conditions as the Commission may specify," and.., a wide
range of remedies are potentially available, including orders barring
individuals from association with a public company.205
section 217 of the English Companies Act. Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46,
§§ 8-9 (Eng.). See also Caroline Bradley, Transatlantic Misunderstandings: Corporate Law and
Societies, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 269, 285-86 (1999) ("The Company Directors (Disqualification)
Act 1986... provides that a court may disqualify a person from acting as a company director ....
The SEC has a similar power in the United States in relation to directors and officers of publicly
traded corporations.").
202. Landis described the debate as to the civil liability of directors as the "bitterest struggle."
Landis, supra note 198, at 48.
203. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2-3 (1933). As James Farrand observed:
[The SEC's] enforcement powers under the principal securities statutes were for many
years restricted by the acts' narrow enforcement provisions. Most of these provisions
authorize nothing more than the initiation of civil suits in the federal courts to obtain
injunctions against future statutory violations.... [H]owever, [starting in the 1970s] the
Commission has succeeded in securing various far reaching orders of "ancillary relief'
to accompany the traditional statutory injunctions against future wrongdoing.
James R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1779,
1779 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
204. James C. Treadway Jr., Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address at the University of
California Twelfth Annual Securities Regulation Institute: Looking for the Perfect Enforcement
Remedy (Jan. 23, 1985).
205. Id. The Exchange Act states:
If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that any person
subject to the provisions of section 781, 78m, 78n of this title, or subsection (d) of this
section or any rule or regulation thereunder has failed to comply with any such
provision, rule, or regulation in any material respect, the Commission may publish its
findings and issue an order requiring such person, and any person who was a cause of
the failure to comply due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known
would contribute to the failure to comply, to comply, or to take steps to effect
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Despite Treadway' s attenuated pronouncement of implied authority to issue
officer and director bars administratively, the reality was that the SEC was
basing attempts to bar officers and directors on broader congressional
"authorizations for SEC civil injunctive actions" 20 6 that require the SEC to seek
equitable relief through a court:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged
or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any
provision of this chapter .... it may in its discretion bring an action in
the proper district court of the United States .... to enjoin such acts or
practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary
207injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
In turn, "the [court's] [a]uthority to [approve the SEC's request for] such relief
[was] based on the general equitable powers of the federal courts in the context
of a comprehensive statutory scheme."20 8 During this time, court approval of
officer and director bars was generally seen as a rubber stamp, as the parties




compliance, with such provision or such rule or regulation thereunder upon such terms
and conditions and within such time as the Commission may specify in such order.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (2006).
206. Farrand, supra note 203, at 1780.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2006).
208. Farrand, supra note 203, at 1781. Sarbanes-Oxley expressly codified the courts' ability
to grant equitable relief by amending section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with
section 305 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which reads, "(5) Equitable Relief.-In any action or proceeding
brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the
Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be
appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 305, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2006). However, the reported cases citing section 305 thus far relate to forcing
disgorgement of funds rather than officer and director bars. See, e.g., SEC v. Dibella, 409 F. Supp.
2d 122, 132 (D. Conn. 2006) (citing § 305) ("Congress expressly clarified the SEC's authority to
seek equitable remedies, such as disgorgement, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act."); SEC v. Save the
World Air, Inc., No. 01-11586, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28313, at *61 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2005)
("[T]he Court's order requiring disgorgement to the Commission of the [money that defendant
obtained] through his fraudulent scheme will act as a deterrent to further misconduct on his part.");
SEC v. Shiv, 379 F. Supp. 2d 609, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[T]his court has jurisdiction [pursuant to
§ 305]... to cause [defrauded funds] to be disgorged .... ); SEC v. Zubkis, No. 97-8086, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13086, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2005) ("The Court may use this broad
equitable power [under § 305] to order the turnover of assets nominally held by third parties where
the third party lacks a legitimate claim to the assets.").
209. The SEC really began delving into corporate management-or at least dipping its toes in
the pool-in the cases of SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,689 (D.D.C. Oct. 1,1974), and SEC v. U.S. Surgical Corp., [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,422 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1984). In these cases, not only did the
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However, Commissioner Treadway was not as confident that there was an
implied SEC right position as he appeared; two years later he was pushing for
express congressional authorization to issue officer and director bars.
210
Treadway was the lead drafter of the Report of the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting in 1987 (the Treadway Report) 211 which was in
response to "such spectacular failures as Drysdale Government Securities,
Washington Public Power Supply System, Baldwin-United Corp., and E.S.M.
Government Securities." 212 Congressional hearings into the causes for these
failures "focused upon whether they could have been avoided by, among other
things, better audit practice" and greater officer and director accountability.
213
The Treadway Commission Report argued,
[S]tiffer penalties for corporate officers and directors involved in
fraudulent financial reporting would be an effective deterrent. In
considering enforcement proceedings against individual corporate
officers or directors who aid and abet, cause, or participate in
SEC remove directors, it actually appointed its own candidates with the approval of the court and
with the consent of the subject corporation:
[The Commissioner of the SEC explained] the Commission has stepped into the world
of corporate management, and, in egregious cases, replaced elected management with
impartial third parties. It has required the appointment of independent directors to a
company's board. The individuals are usually subject to prior court and Commission
approval.
Let me give you an example-the often-cited Mattel case. Independent directors
were brought into the toy company's management structure to oversee accounting
procedures and the preparation of financial statements. This imaginative approach
allowed Mattel to continue its operations, but assured the SEC that Mattel would not
continue to inflate its profits and make fraudulent disclosures.
A similar consent decree was entered into in connection with the settlement last
year of the U.S. Surgical matter. Surgical was required to appoint two non-affiliated
directors to its Board. The two were to serve on the audit committee that was charged
with reviewing the company's SEC filings and financial statements.
Aulana L. Peters, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address at the Washington State Bar
Association and the Northwest Securities Institutes: Ancillary Relief and Remedies: Exotic,
Extraordinary, or Just Plain Effective? (Feb. 23, 1985), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/1985/022385peters.pdf. For details as to the Mattel consent decree, see Handler v.
SEC, 610 F.2d 656, 657-59 (9th Cir. 1979).
210. See NAT'L COMM'N ON FRAUDULENT FIN. ACCOUNTING, REPORT OF THE NAT'L
COMM'N ON FRADULENT FIN. ACCOUNTING 66 (1987), available at http://www.coso.org/
Publications/NCFFR.pdf [hereinafter TREADWAY REPORT].
211. Id. at 1.
212. Joseph Grundfest, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address at the University of
California, San Diego Sixteenth Annual Securities Regulation Institute: The Treadway





South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss1/5
fraudulent financial reporting, the SEC therefore should consider
whether to bar those individuals from future service in that capacity in
a public company. The bar, which the SEC could tailor as appropriate
to the case, could be either temporary, like a suspension, or permanent.
The permanent bar would be appropriate if the violation was
particularly egregious or the violator were a repeat offender.
214
On the Treadway Commission's recommendation, Congress took a cautious
first step and allowed the SEC to bar directors if a federal district court
approved. The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act
of 1990 (the Remedies Act) provided that a court could issue officer and
director bars for "substantial unfitness." 215 The Securities Act of 1933, as
amended by the Remedies Act, states that a court may
prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such
period of time as it shall determine, any person who violated section
17q(a)(1) of this title from acting as an officer or director of any issuer
that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781 of this
title or that is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of this
title if the person's conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serveS• 216
as an officer or director of any such issuer.
For ten years there was no change. Parties agreed to and courts approved of
occasional officer and director bars by consent decree. Then, in 2002, in the
wake of Enron, Congress again focused on new ways, using old ideas, to force
corporate principals to work within the bounds of the law. Congress's
conclusion was to make it easier for the SEC to bar persons from serving as
corporate principals by giving the SEC the right to administratively issue officer
214. TREADWAY REPORT, supra note 210.
215. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, § 101, 104 Stat. 931, 933 (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2000)), amended by
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 305(a)(2), 116 Stat. 745, 778-79 (2002)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2006)) (Sarbanes-Oxley § 305 substituted "unfitness" for
"substantial unfitness"). The prior amendment to the Securities Act of 1933 expanded injunctive
relief but not officer and director bars. Securities and Exchange Commission Authorization Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-181, § 208(a), 101 Stat. 1249, 1253 (1987) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)
(2006)).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2006); see also Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 201, 104 Stat. 931, 935-36 (1990) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2000)), amended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §
305(a)(2), 116 Stat. 745, 778-79 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2006)) (granting like
authority for violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1943; Sarbanes-Oxley § 305 amended
§ 21 (d), substituting "unfitness" for "substantial unfitness").
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217and director bars -Congress would cut the courts out of the process. One can
imagine the conversation:
CONGRESSMAN I: I have a great idea; we will offer up the officers and
directors as a sacrifice to the electoral gods. Let's give the courts the
power to issue officer and director bars.
CONGRESSMAN II: But we already went after the officers and directors
in 1990 when we gave the courts the power to bar...
CONGRESSMAN 1: Alright then, we will give the power to the SEC to
bar persons administratively. No bothersome courts. The officers and
directors won't know what hit them.
The early version of Sarbanes-Oxley expanded SEC power by allowing the SEC
to administratively issue officer and director bars, but it retained court created
factors for determining "substantial unfitness" and allowed for an automatic
stay of the bar pending judicial review.218 However, when the WorldCom
scandal broke, it became clear that Enron was not an isolated incident. Calls for
217. Hearing on H.R. 3763, supra note 143, at 77 (statement of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
218. H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 11 (as passed by House, Apr. 24, 2002). The first version of
Sarbanes-Oxley stated,
(a) COMMISSION AUTHORITY To PROHIBIT PERSONS FROM SERVING AS OFFICERS OR
DIRECTORS.-Notwithstanding any other provision of the securities laws, in any cease-
and-desist proceeding... the Commission may issue an order to prohibit, conditionally
or unconditionally, permanently or for such period of time as it shall determine, any
person... from acting as an officer or director... if the person's conduct demonstrates
substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer.
(b) FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL UNFITNESS.-In making any determination that a
person's conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director of
any such issuer, the Commission shall consider-
(1) the severity of the persons conduct giving rise to the violation, and the persons role
or position when he engaged in the violation;
(2) the person's degree of scienter;
(3) the person's economic gain as a result of the violation; and
(4) the likelihood that the conduct giving rise to the violation, or similar conduct as
defined in subsection (a), may recur if the person is not so prohibited.
(c) AUTOMATIC STAY PENDING APPEAL.-The enforcement of any Commission order
pursuant to subsection (a) shall be stayed-
(1) for a period of at least 60 days after the entry of any such order or decision; and
(2) upon the filing of a timely application for judicial review of such order or decision,
pending the entry of a final order resolving the application for judicial review.
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officer and accountant accountability increased in the business press.219
Congress determined that the SEC may now issue an officer and director bar
pursuant to a cease-and-desist proceeding:
In any cease-and-desist proceeding under subsection (a), the
Commission may issue an order to prohibit, conditionally or
unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as it shall
determine, any person who has violated section 10(b) or the rules or
regulations thereunder, from acting as an officer or director of any
issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12, or
that is required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d), if the conduct
of that person demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or director
of any such issuer. 220
The first things to notice are that the SEC may now issue a officer and director
bar without court supervision, and there is no automatic stay of the bar pending
judicial review. 221 The second is that Congress actually lowered the standard
from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness. ' ' 222 As to whether substantial
219. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21; see also Paul D. Paton & Deborah L. Rhode,
Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 10 (2002) ("President Bush captured
widespread sentiment in calling for 'a new ethic of personal responsibility in the business
community'; greater transparency in corporate accounting and corporate conduct .... (quoting
President George W. Bush, President Announces Tough New Enforcement Initiatives for Reform,
Remarks on Corporate Responsibility (July 9, 2002))), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/print/20020709-4.html).
220. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1105 (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2000); Securities Act of 1933 § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2000)) (emphasis added).
221. Id. Sure, there is the ability to challenge the removal after the fact, but by then, the horse
is out of the barn. The case ofInternational Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974),
is illustrative. In Vesco, the court ordered that, "[SEC approved directors] shall replace the existing
board of directors of International Controls, and shall have full power under applicable corporate
law to conduct the affairs of International Controls in conjunction with the Special Counsel." Id. at
1340. The shareholder, Vesco, insisted that he had a right to elect directors; he went to state court
to stop "the court-appointed board of directors from exercising their duties." Id. at 1352. The
federal court enjoined the state action, finding that the state court action "represents a direct assault
on the Final Judgment [of the federal court] and constitutes an attempt to frustrate the court's order
appointing a new board of directors for ICC by seeking to enjoin the functioning of the board." Id.
As such, even if shareholders decide to stand on their rights, they will find no help from the courts.
222. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2002), amended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305(a)(1) (2002). The
Amendment is as follows:
Sec. 305. Officer and Director Bars and Penalties.
(a) Unfitness Standard.-
(1) SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934.-Section 21(d)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(2)) is amended by striking "substantial
unfitness" and inserting "unfitness."
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unfitness is any different than unfitness, the author will leave to others to
consider. 223 For purposes of this Article it is sufficient to show that Congress
amended the securities laws to allow the SEC to dole out greater and greater
punishment against officers and directors while doing nothing to hold
accountable the lawyers who knowingly structured the deals that led to
securities fraud. 224 Further, while the SEC showed itself to be very timid in its
approach to holding lawyers accountable, it went full throttle after the officers
and accountants. Harvey L. Pitt, the Chairman of the SEC in 2002,
commented during his testimony before the House Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs that "the present securities laws authorize us to
petition a court if we want to bar officers and directors who break our laws. We
could use this tool more effectively and protect investors far more efficiently if
we could impose this sanction administratively. ' 226 And later, in an exchange
between Representative Shays and Mr. Pitt:
(2) SECURITIES ACT OF 1933.-Section 20(e) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15
U.S.C. 77t(e)) is amended by striking "substantial unfitness" and inserting
"unfitness."
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305. Additionally, for these penalties to apply, the officer or director must
work for an "issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781 of this title or
that is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of [the Securities Act]." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77t(e).
223. This Article makes no attempt to tackle other interesting questions, such as establishing
a framework for director removal post-Sabarnes-Oxley. Commentators have already undertaken
the question of how courts should view the reduced standard, with various results. See, e.g., Jayne
W. Barnard, Rule lOB-5 and the "Unfitness Question," 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 46-53 (2005) (setting
forth nine factors to determine unfitness); Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and
Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 BuS. LAW 391, 408 (2004) ("Ironically, it is not even clear
from the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley that the change in language from 'substantial
unfitness' to 'unfitness' was intended to reduce the quantum of proof required of the
government.").
224. See supra text accompanying notes 215-222.
225. Id.
226. Accounting Reform and Investor Protection: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 1071 (2002) (statement of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) [hereinafter Statement of Chairman Pitt]. At the first session of the 107th
Congress, Pitt made the same request, stating,
the Commission should be given administrative authority to bar officers and directors of
public companies who commit violations of the Federal securities laws from serving as
officers and directors. We can do that in the securities industry. The banking agencies
can do it with banks. I believe we should be able to do it with public corporations,
obviously subject to review."
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MR. SHAYS: In the Oxley-Baker bill, which I am a cosponsor of, is
there any new authority that you would like to see in the bill that is not
in the bill now?
MR. PITT: The principal authority that we would like to see included is
our ability administratively to bar someone from serving as an officer
or director of a company if we find that they have engaged in egregious
misconduct.
MR. SIAYS: Is that the primary addition?
MR. PITT: That is the principal one.
227
One would like to think that the stenographer did not get the rest of Mr. Pitt's
answer, but that the whole answer was, "That is the principal one, and we
should probably have something in there to hold accountable the lawyers that
structured the deals that made all these financial machinations possible."
Instead, it is more likely that Mr. Pitt thought it politically expedient to leave the
lawyers alone.
C. Tougher Accounting Standards
As shown above, the ABA accused Congress of overstepping its bounds
when Congress proposed additional ethical rules for lawyers-up and out
reporting. That argument seems weak when you consider that accountants-
like lawyers, a traditionally self-regulated profession-find themselves
answering to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).
229
The PCAOB "replac[ed] the system of self-regulation for the accounting
profession" and
227. Hearing on H.R. 3763, supra note 143, at 83.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 157-170.
229. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 403, 408-09 (2003) ("Sarbanes-Oxley creates an entirely new structure for regulating
accountants.... These provisions directly regulate a formerly self-regulated... group."); France,
W4hat About the Latyers?, supra note 4, at 58, 59 ("[A]ccountants will be answering to a new
independent oversight board."). There are also technical changes. For instance, Sarbanes-Oxley
requires that all financial reports be accurate and "disclose all material off-balance sheet
transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations),... that may have a
material current or future effect on financial condition." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 401(a), 116 Stat. 745, 786 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78mj) (2006)). Any non-GAAP
financial calculations included in a financial report must be disclosed and not be "misleading." Id.
§ 401(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7261).
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was given broad powers and authority, including those to register
public accounting firms, to set by rule auditing, ethics, quality control
and independence standards, to inspect the auditing operations of
registered accounting firms, to investigate violations of ethics or
conduct set by the profession itself and the PCAOB's own rules, and to
enforce compliance with the new legislation and the PCAOB's own
rules.
230
Many commentators have written in detail about the severity of subjecting
accountants to the PCAOB. 231 For our purposes, it is sufficient to show that
accountants receive less favorable treatment than lawyers despite the fact that
the roles played by the two were comparable. Indeed, the lawyers were at least
as culpable as the officers and directors in the fall of Enron.
VI. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Parts II through V of this Article have set forth and have defended a number
of propositions related to the fall of Enron and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.
First, corporate lawyers were at least as culpable as officers and accountants in
the fall of Enron. Enron's lawyers designed the schemes that hid billions of
dollars in debt, drafted the documents that brought the schemes to life, and then
drafted legal opinions Enron's bankers relied upon in certifying that the entire
process was perfectly legal.
232
Second, corporate lawyers received favorable legislative treatment despite
their culpability. Lawyers avoided aiding and abetting liability and up and out
reporting. On the other hand, corporate officers suffer under an expanded SEC
power-officer and director bars-to administratively bar them from serving
public corporations in any substantial capacity. Accountants face the scrutiny of
the PCAOB and are no longer self-regulated. 
33
Third, corporate lawyers' role in the scandal was not immediately obvious
in the aftermath of Enron, and the business press did not cover it. As such,
230. John Yozzo, The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Disaster: You Can't
Make This Stuff Up!, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, at 30, 30.
231. See, e.g., George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting
Before and After Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325, 1349 (2003) (examining the PCAOB's expansive
authority to establish standards related to auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and the
preparation of audit reports") (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7213); Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with
Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975,
1007 (2005) ("[T]he PCAOB constitutes a radical change to the accounting profession's former
system of self-regulation.").
232. See supra Part II.B.
233. See supra Part V.C.
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corporate lawyers were able to marshal their resistance to legislation. On the
other hand, the business lobby and the accounting lobby virtually shut down in
the face of increased business press scrutiny.
234
Finally, Congress was more interested in quickly passing legislation to
restore the investing masses' confidence than in making sure that such
legislation actually addressed the issues that led to the Enron scandal. 235 Thus,
the best explanation for Sarbanes-Oxley's favorable treatment of corporate
lawyers is their access to the politicians' ear in the aftermath of Enron.
Campaign contributions amplified an already close relationship between
legislators and lawyers. 236 This final statement is, of course, the most
controversial. Part VI aims to dispel the counterargument that public policy
considerations can best explain the favorable treatment of corporate lawyers-it
cannot.
A. Policy Arguments Do Not Explain Why the Act Treated Corporate
Lawyers Favorably
The intent of this Article is to tell a story about corporate lawyers' influence
in politics and, by extension, why Sarbanes-Oxley treated similarly situated
parties differently. The Article has set forth competing policy arguments to
show that policy arguments alone do not explain why Sarbanes-Oxley treatedS 237
corporate lawyers favorably, compared to corporate officers and accountants.
Indeed, if we were to weigh the policy implications-considering theories
of efficiency and societal betterment-Sarbanes-Oxley would look much
different. Some might argue that this is too cynical; that, for example,
legislators omitted up and out reporting requirements in Sarbanes-Oxley in
order to save attorney-client confidentiality (an oft cited policy argument) -
not because of campaign contributions. The fact is, our legal culture does not
hold sacrosanct attorney-client confidentiality. 239 Most jurisdictions adopt a
specific exception to the attorney-client privilege providing that "[a] lawyer
may reveal ... [t]he intention of a client to commit a crime and the information
234. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21, 157-158, 187-194.
235. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Part W.A.
237. As Arthur Leff so eloquently stated, when politicians pass legislation they "ought to
have the political nerve to do so with some understanding (and some disclosure) of what [they] are
doing." Arthur Allen Left, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 558 (1967) (emphasis added).
238. See, e.g., ABA Letter to the SEC, supra note 167 (arguing that noisy withdrawal will
"destroy issuers' trust and confidence in their attorneys").
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necessary to prevent the crime. ' 24° Texas, where Enron is located, allows a
lawyer to reveal confidential information about a client or a former client
"[w]hen the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act" after trying to
dissuade the client from continuing in such conduct.
241
Setting aside reporting out, what about liability for lawyers who aid and
abet securities fraud? Again, critics argue that the prospect of liability for aiding
and abetting would encourage attorneys to violate their duty of
confidentiality. 242 In its motion to be dismissed from In re Enron Corp.
Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, Enron's lawyers argued that the
court should not revive aiding and abetting liability for lawyers because doing
so would create two conflicting duties: on one hand keeping their client's
confidences and on the other hand disclosing those very confidences to avoid
liability.243 Judge Harmon rejected this argument, stating in essence that
reviving aiding and abetting liability would prohibit the firm from aiding and
abetting securities fraud; it would not require the lawyer to disclose anything. 244
"[T]he firms could have withdrawn from the representation without also• • ,,245
reporting Enron; the two decisions were separate. Judge Harmon got that
point right-the two decisions are separate. As such, the preferred policy
argument against lawyer accountability-client confidentiality-is not
dispositive.
B. Should the SEC Be Involved in Corporate Governance?
Additionally, there are strong policy arguments against involving the SEC
in the most sacrosanct of shareholder rights-choosing officers and directors.
The SEC should not be in the business of issuing officer and director bars and,
by implication, appointing officers and directors to public companies. 246 Doing
240. N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (2002).
241. TEx. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.05(c)(7) (2005).
242. See ABA Letter to the SEC, supra note 167.
243. Defendant Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.'s Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at
9-10, In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 258 F. Supp. 2d 576 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(No. H01-3625). But see In re Enron, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (noting that while the court did not
revive aiding and abetting liability for lawyers, it did determine that a lawyer "may be liable as a
primary violator under § 10(b)").
244. See In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 589-91.
245. Sebok, supra note 124.
246. While this Article focuses on officer and director bars, the SEC has also increased the
appointment of directors to the boards of troubled corporations, as it did in SEC v. Mattell and SEC
v. U.S. Surgical. See discussion supra note 209. Examples abound: In 2003 the federal monitor
appointed to oversee WorldCom appointed an entirely new board of directors. See, e.g., Sue
Reisinger, Companies in Trouble Get Their Own Monitor, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 2004 at 5, 5 ("[The
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so is in direct contravention of the traditional adherence to the legal doctrine of
shareholder primacy.247 At the risk of oversimplification, this doctrine provides
that the officers and directors work for the shareholders. 248 As the owners of the
corporation, the shareholders have absolute authority to choose directors and,
through them, to manage the affairs of the corporation.
249
[D]irect shareholder control of the business... [is] a legitimate form of
corporate governance. However, there are reasons to prefer an
alternative. It would be very difficult to have.., even a relatively small
number of shareholders attempting to run the business directly through
democratic means .... To deal with [this] practical difficult[y], the law
provides for the election of directors to manage the business on [the
shareholders'] behalf. However .... this is entirely facilitative: the goal
is not to take control away from shareholders, but rather to place
management responsibility in the hands of talented and dedicated
individuals. 250
If the shareholders could better maximize profits, they would manage the
corporation themselves-no officers or directors would be needed. Efficiency
federal monitor] approved all major financial decisions at WorldCom, and met with the company's
bankers and creditors."); Judge OKs WorldCom Settlement, Hous. CHRON., July 8, 2003, at C12
("[A] federal monitor appointed to prevent corporate looting and document destruction, has acted
as a financial watchdog, imposing extraordinary strict discipline upon the company .... ). The
federal monitor appointed to Bristol Myers Squibb appointed one director to the board of directors.
State Looks to Reform Instead of Indictments, N.J. REC., Dec. 30, 2005, at A12. The federal
monitor appointed to Computer Associates, Inc. appointed two new directors to the board. Former
CEO of Computer Associated Indicted for Securities Fraud, LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS, Sept. 24,
2004, http://fmdarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4l89/is_20040924/ai-ni0170708.
247. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
407, 437 (2006) ("According to the traditional view.... [s]hareholders are the owners of the
corporation. They elect directors to mange the business on their behalf.").
248. Id. at 437-38. Indeed, the conclusions of this Article would be entirely different should
we view corporations through the prism of social responsibility theory. See id. at 451-52 ("[Social
responsibility theorists] do not believe that the corporation exists solely, or even primarily, for the
benefit of its shareholders; they insist that there are other values that the corporation and corporate
law must serve."); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440 (2001) (arguing that the intellectual debate has settled on
shareholder primacy).
249. See Velasco, supra note 247. The New York Business Corporation Law clearly provides
that the election and removal of directors is a power vested in the shareholders. N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 703 (McKinney 2003) ("At each annual meeting of shareholders, directors shall be elected
to hold office until the next annual meeting .... ); id. § 706 ("Any or all of the directors may be
removed for cause by vote of the shareholders .... If the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws
so provide, any or all of the directors may be removed without cause by vote of the
shareholders.").
250. Velasco, supra note 247, at 441 (emphasis added).
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dictates otherwise. Indeed, a corporation is like a "'little republic[]"' where
"[p]ower [is] distributed among [its] citizens-the shareholders-via suffrage,
electoral, and other rights that were inscribed in the corporation's
constitution. ' ' 251 Like the federal government's power is derived from the
people, so too, the corporation's power is derived from the shareholders.
252
Allowing the SEC to remove officers and directors is an assault on the
cornerstone of shareholder primacy-shareholder suffrage.25 3 Yet this is exactly
what allowing the SEC to choose who can and cannot serve as directors does.
251. Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History
of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1353 (2006) (citing 140 PARL.
DEB., H.L. & H.C. (3d ser.) (1856) 134).
252. This is especially surprising given that legislators recognized shareholder supremacy
during the debates. See 148 CONG. REC. 13829-35 (2002) (statement of Rep. McInnis).
Representative McInnis succinctly emphasized the idea that shareholders are the owners of the
corporation, and as such, absent externalities-such as poor information-can choose an effective
management team:
[S]hareholders are really the foundation in the corporation. They pool their money
together so that they can build a business....
Now, the shareholders are represented by a number of different people and
different people have different duties to the shareholders. Again, keep in mind the
shareholders are the owners. For example, here, the shareholders elect a board of
directors.
Now, what is a board of directors? A lot of people will tell you that the chief
executive officer, which in the old days was called the president of the corporation, that
the president of the corporation was really the person who ran that corporation. That is
not true ....
... [The chief executive officer] is not the top individual of that corporation. He or she
answers to the board of directors [who in turn] answer to the shareholders. And ... this
is the fundamental structure, you have the shareholders who elect the board of
directors ... and they elect the[] board of directors to represent their interests, the
interests of the shareholders. They do not elect this board of directors to represent the
interests of the chief executive officer. The chief executive officer is simply a tool in the
operation of this corporation.
Now, this sounds a little mundane; but you have to have a pretty good
understanding of this to figure out where this fraud is taking place, why the checks and
balances in our corporate structure in this country have broken down, what we need to
do to bring back solutions.
Id. at 13830.
253. At least some commentators have noted that the appointment of federal monitors is a
"significant intrusion on shareholder suffrage," and by implication, an attack on shareholder
primacy. Jennifer O'Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89, 93 (2006). Jeffrey J. Haas and Steven R. Howard wrote:
[A federal monitor] displaces ... management entirely. This includes both the
shareholder-elected board of directors and the officers appointed by the board. Second,
the appointment of a receiver eliminates, either temporarily or permanently, shareholder
suffrage. While the receivership remedy is the ultimate "no confidence" vote in the
[VOL. 60:149
48
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss1/5
Courts were traditionally hostile to SEC tampering in corporate governance,
so much so that Sarbanes-Oxley's officer and director bars can be seen as
statutorily overruling prior court precedent.2 54 In Fallstaff Brewing Corporation,
the Commission alleged that Fallstaff repeatedly violated the securities laws by
disseminating materially false proxy statements, together with filing false and
misleading reports with the SEC. The SEC requested that the court approve
numerous independent directors to Fallstaff s board of directors. 256 The court
refused, reasoning that "the [c]ourt should not, without considerable
justification, impose a remedy which would in effect regulate areas traditionally
left to internal corporate management." 257 In the more recent case of SEC v.
Patel,258 the SEC again found itself in the position of having its efforts to
interfere in corporate governance rejected, when the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the SEC could not bar the defendant from acting as a director
on the facts presented.
259
directors and officers, a court casts that vote at the SEC's behest rather than
shareholders.
Jeffrey J. Haas & Steven R. Howard, The Heartland Funds' Receivership and Its Implications for
Independent Mutual Fund Directors, 51 EMORY L.J. 153, 157 (2002).
254. Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 305, 116 Stat. 745, 778-
79 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2006)) (providing equitable relief in the form of officer
and director bars), with SEC v. Fallstaff Brewing Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,455-73 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 1978) (refusing to interfere with internal corporate
management).
255. Fallstaff Brewing Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 94,45941.
256. Id. at 94,473.
257. Id. But see SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,689 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1974). George W. Dent Jr. summarized Mattel as follows:
In its initial complaint, the SEC alleged that in 1973 Mattel made filings and press
releases that were false and misleading. Simultaneously with the filing of the complaint,
Mattel consented to, and the court entered, a judgment that permanently enjoined Mattel
from violating the 1934 Act. The judgment also required Mattel to appoint two new
unaffiliated directors .... When Mattel informed the SEC a few months later of further
securities law violations, the Commission obtained Mattel's consent to additional relief,
including the appointment and maintenance for five years of a majority of unaffiliated
directors on a new executive committee and on the whole board .... Despite initial
reluctance, the district judge granted the requested relief with certain modifications. The
company and the SEC enforcement staff chose new directors from a list of persons
cleared by the Commission. Shareholders played no role in this selection and were
denied their usual right to fill these directorships during the five-year period of the
decree. The judgment involved substantial, continuing court involvement in the
corporation's affairs.
George W. Dent Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67
MINN. L. REV. 865, 873-74 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
258. 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995).
259. Id. at 140-41.
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[I]n reversing the lifetime injunction against an officer of a
company who was found to have violated the Federal securities laws,
the court discussed a nonexclusive six factor test for considering fitness
to serve as officer or director: (1) the egregiousness of the violation; (2)
whether the defendant was a recidivist; (3) the defendant's position
when he engaged in the fraud; (4) the degree of scienter; (5) the
defendant's economic gain from the violation; and (6) the likelihood
that the defendant would repeat the misconduct.
260
The Patel factors were intended to temper the drastic impact of the officer and
director bar,2 61 yet Congress has thrown them out.
262
Additionally, there are better ways to protect the public from corporate
fraud: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for industrial diseases. [And
s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants. '" 263 That is to say, the intent of
the securities laws is to protect shareholders by making sure that they have
adequate information.264 Disclosure requirements have been "the basis for the
260. Statement of Chairman Pitt, supra note 226, at 1114 (citing Patel, 61 F.3d at 141). The
fact is that the SEC was having fits about this case. Pitt complained about Patel at the Enron
Hearings:
At present, the securities laws authorize us to seek officer and director bars in court in
appropriate cases. But some courts have taken an inhospitable approach to the plain
legislative language, thwarting our ability to prevent some officers and directors who
inflict serious harm on investors from repeating that kind of conduct. We will continue
to press for a more enlightened and hospitable reading of the statutory language, but we
believe the Commission should have the ability, administratively, to [a]ffect such relief
promptly, subject of course to subsequent judicial review of the Commission's action.
We also think the Commission should have the authority to impose penalties in these
instances. By removing existing judicial restraints, and by providing for judicial review
of the Commission's imposition of such a sanction, you will be giving us a tool we need
to address and deter corporate malfeasance and misfeasance-akin to our authority to do
the same with brokerage firm personnel, stock exchange officers, directors and others,
akin to the authority of the banking regulators to bar future service by banking officers
and directors. A recent edition of Business Week reported that a significant majority of
the chief financial officers polled by Business Week and the Financial Executives
International favored harsher penalties for officers and directors who fail to discharge
their duties properly.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
261. See Patel, 61 F.3d at 141-42.
262. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 305, 116 Stat. 745, 778-79
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2006)) ("[Courts have discretion to] prohibit, conditionally
or unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as it shall determine, any [officer or
director] who violated [the securities laws]").
263. LoUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 62
(Richard M. Abrams ed., Harper Torchbooks 1967) (1914).
264. That is why the securities laws turn on what information is available to investors when
determining if the registration requirements of the securities laws will apply. See, e.g., Securities
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development of our strong securities markets" and have proven to be effective,
without threatening shareholder supremacy. 265 Preventing another Enron does
not require SEC participation in corporate governance; it requires "forc[ing]... .. .. ,,266
businesses to disclose much more financial information in real-time. Enron
was not the result of a failure to bar certain persons from serving as officers or
directors-an ex post facto remedy; instead, it was the result of financial
information not making its way to shareholders. Enron's financial woes were
directly attributable to investors receiving inaccurate-indeed fraudulent-
financial information.
In fact, to the extent that Sarbanes-Oxley can be considered a success for
returning investors' confidence to the markets, 268 such success is attributable to
Sarbanes-Oxley's strengthening of the mandatory reporting requirements
contained within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 269 As President Bush
reassured the public during the signing of the Act, the "financial information
[shareholders] receive from a company will be true and reliable. ' 27° The
accuracy enhancement model is the traditional model explaining the need for
financial transparency of corporations and is summarized as follows:
[M]andatory disclosure [should] help[] market participants to determine
prices for securities that accurately reflect all available information.
Disclosure can contribute to informational efficiency (and ultimately to
social welfare) by enabling traders to gather information, and thereby
Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006) (exempting from registration "transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering"), construed in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 1
(1953) ("The design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions.") and Doran v. Petrol. Mgmt.
Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 909 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that exemption status turns on whether the
offerees had sufficient information to make an informed investment).
265. See H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 42 (2002).
266. 148 CONG. REC. 5503 (2002) (statement of Rep. Biggert).
267. Id. (statement of Rep. Lee) ("[1]nvestors lost money because Enron cooked its books.").
268. On September 27, 2007, five years after Enron, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
(DJIA) was at 13,913. Dow Jones Indexes, http://www.djindexes.com (follow "Dow Jones
Averages" hyperlink; then follow "Index Data" hyperlink; then select "Industrial average"; then
select "September 27, 2007" as Begin Date and End Date; then follow "Get Report" hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 5, 2008). Just seven days prior to the signing of Sarbanes-Oxley, the DJIA was at
7,702. Id. (select "July 23, 2002" as Begin Date and End Date; then follow "Get Report"
hyperlink).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (supp. 2006).
270. Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1319 (July 30,
2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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reflect new information in prices, at a reduced cost compared to a world
without disclosure. 271
According to the accuracy enhancement model, Sarbanes-Oxley should provide
people with accurate information to assist them in making efficient purchasing
decisions.
272
Once a prospective investor becomes a shareholder, the purpose of
corporate financial transparency is best described by the agency cost model. 273
As set out by Professor Paul G. Mahoney, the agency cost model provides that
"the principal purpose of mandatory disclosure is to address certain agency
problems that arise between corporate promoters and investors, and between
271. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. C1I.
L. REV. 1047, 1047-48 (1995) (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case
for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel
R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984);
Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security
Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1981)). This Article makes no attempt to differentiate between the
types of information that corporations should make available. For an in-depth analysis, see Michael
D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 123, 195 (2004) ("With the findings here, a coherent foundation is now available to
determine which disclosure requirements should be imposed on public companies.").
272. Appropriately, Sarbanes-Oxley made financial transparency a cornerstone of the
legislation by strengthening the mandatory reporting requirements of the securities laws. For
example, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that all financial reports be accurate and "disclose all material
off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations)...
that may have a material current or future effect on financial condition." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 401(a), 116 Stat. 745, 786 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78mj) (2006)).
Any non-GAAP financial calculations included in a financial report must be disclosed and must
not be "misleading." Id. § 401(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7261(b) (2006)); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 244.100 (2008) ("A registrant... shall not make public a non-GAAP financial measure that...
contains an untrue statement .... ). The Act also requires that each year a corporation file a report
summarizing the corporation's internal control procedures that ensure accurate financial reporting.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006)). Finally, the Act requires that the
financial disclosures of each company be reviewed by the SEC at least once every three years. Id.
§ 408 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7266 (2006)). This is, of course, a fundamental premise of
neoclassical economics, that is, that actors have complete and accurate information. "Neoclassical
economics... may be conveniently defined as an approach which (1) assumes rational,
maximizing behavior by agents with given and stable preference functions, (2) focuses on attained,
or movements toward, equilibrium states, and (3) excludes chronic information problems."
Geoffrey Hodgson, The Approach of Institutional Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 166, 169
n.4 (1998); see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 755466 (2006) (discussing financial disclosure's effect on an
efficient market); Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure
Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: "Are We There Yet?," 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135,
197-98 (1998) (discussing whether mandatory disclosure under the accuracy enhancement
justification makes us better off).
273. See Mahoney, supra note 271, at 1048.
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corporate managers and shareholders." 274 Mahoney's view is that "[d]isclosure
can help reduce the cost of monitoring promoters' and managers' use of
corporate assets for self-interested purposes."275 In short, under the agency cost
model, the purpose of mandatory disclosure is to allow shareholders to control
directors, which in turn reinforces shareholder primacy.276 The foregoing
analysis indicates that a better method for preventing corporate fraud is
improved disclosure-not officer and director bars.
VII. CONCLUSION
In 1934, in the wake of the Great Depression, then Associate Justice Harlan
F. Stone gave a speech at the University of Michigan where he argued that
lawyers had enabled the financial excesses of the 1920s that resulted in the great
stock market crash of October 29, 1929. The corresponding "harm done to a
social order founded upon business and dependent upon its integrity, [is]
incalculable."' 277 He continued,
There is little to suggest that the Bar has yet recognized that it must
bear some burden of responsibility for these evils. But when we know
and face the facts we shall have to acknowledge that such departures
from the fiduciary principle do not usually occur without the active
assistance of some member of our profession, and that their increasing
recurrence would have been impossible but for the complaisance of a
Bar, too absorbed in the workaday care of private interests to take
account of these events of profound import or to sound the warning that
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See id. Of course, even the transparency requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley have
detractors, many of whom believe that the requirements are too burdensome. See, e.g., Tosha
Huffman, Note, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Where the Knee Jerk Bruises Shareholders
and Lifts the External Auditor, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 239, 257 (2004) ("Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley
should be repealed for the betterment of corporate America and in order to preserve shareholder
wealth."). Huffman argues that increased accounting expenses take money directly from
shareholders' pockets. Id. (citing PHILIP L. COOLEY, BUSINESS FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 15 (3d
ed. 1994)). I believe that is a misplaced criticism. A well run corporation should meet these
requirements anyway. There is no doubt that Enron's shareholders would have valued better
accounting practices on the part of the company, even if it meant a marginal decrease in stock
value.
277. Harlan F. Stone, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Public Influence of the Bar, Address
at the Dedication of the University of Michigan Law Quadrangle (June 15, 1934), in 48 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 9 (1934).
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the profession looks askance upon these, as things that "are not
done."
278
Like the lawyers of the 1920s, the lawyers of today enabled-indeed cooked
up-the legal structures that resulted in the fall of Enron; now, like in 1934,
"There is little to suggest that the Bar has yet recognized that it must bear some
burden of responsibility for these evils."279 Instead, corporate officers and
accountants-both of whom made easier legislative targets-shouldered the
burden of Sarbanes-Oxley.
280
Whatever Sarbanes-Oxley purported to do to stop corporate scandals, its
arbitrary structure-different treatment of lawyers, officers, and accountants-
does little to prevent lawyers from helping companies hide debt in the future. If
you need proof, just look at the front page of the Financial Times or the Wall
Street Journal from the first part of 2008. The new aider and abettor scandals
range from the simple (as the Financial Times reported, "an internal probe
triggered by a regulatory investigation found 'significant deficiencies' in how
[GE] books revenues" ) to the exotic (Citibank, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan
Stanley have relied on complicated schemes engineered by corporate lawyers to
bundle and sell overvalued mortgages in private securities transactions and use
loopholes to pass those securities onto the public markets). 283 And the scandals
continue.
278. Id. (emphasis added).
279. Id.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 157-170, 228-231.
281. See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera & Daneil Pimlott, GE Reporting 'Deficiencies' Spark
Internal Investigation, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at 25, 25 ("GE said its internal probe had found
Isignificant deficiencies in [its] internal control over financial reporting."'); Kathryn Kranhold &
Randall Smith, GE to Adjust Accounting in Bid to End Probe, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2008, at A3
("General Electric Co. is expected to make changes to its accounting policies and procedures in an
effort to end a long-running Securities and Exchange Commission probe .....
282. Guerrera & Pimlott, supra note 281.
283. Susan Pulliam & Serena Ng, Default Fears Unnerve Markets-Emerging Risks in Bond
Insurance Add to Turmoil, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2008, at Al.
[VOL. 60:149
54
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss1/5
